All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2025): Seniority in Higher Judicial Services Revisited

All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2025): Seniority in Higher Judicial Services Revisited

The Constitution Bench judgment dated 19 November 2025 in All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., I.A. No. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No. 1022 of 1989, marks a significant and structural intervention by the Supreme Court of India on the vexed issue of determining inter se seniority within the cadre of Higher Judicial Services (HJS) across the country. At its core, the judgment rejects pleas for giving additional weightage or preferential treatment to promotee District Judges (both regular promotees and LDCE promotees) over direct recruits on the basis of prior service in the lower judiciary, and instead reaffirms that once officers enter a common cadre, the birthmark of their source of recruitment is lost. The Court simultaneously rationalises and standardises the seniority mechanism through a mandatory 4‑point annual roster (2 RPs : 1 LDCE : 1 DR) and lays down detailed guidelines to be incorporated in all State HJS service rules.^[1]

Background: The Long Journey of All India Judges Association Litigation

The present interlocutory application arises in a writ petition that has been pending before the Supreme Court since 1989 as a vehicle of “ongoing mandamus” to safeguard judicial independence and improve conditions of service in the subordinate judiciary. The HJS – broadly the cadre of District Judges – is filled from three streams: (i) Regular Promotees (RPs) from Civil Judge (Senior Division); (ii) promotees through Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE); and (iii) Direct Recruits (DRs) from the Bar. The inter se seniority of these three streams within one common cadre has repeatedly generated litigation and conflicting approaches at State level.

The Court traces in detail the trajectory of the All India Judges Association (AIJA) series of decisions, which have progressively shaped the structure of the subordinate judiciary:

The AIJA Decisions and Structural Reform

1. First AIJA (1992): Addressed broad issues such as All India Judicial Service, uniform designations, retirement age (60 years), pay scales, housing, allowances, libraries and training, all geared towards strengthening judicial independence and institutional status of judicial officers.
2. Second AIJA (1993): In review, the Court introduced crucial changes, including prescribing three years’ practice at the Bar as the minimum qualification for recruitment to the lowest rung of the judiciary and permitting weeding out of “dead wood” before age 60.
3. Third AIJA (1994): Approved higher minimum Bar practice (e.g., five years in Kerala) as being consistent with the baseline of three years. It also invalidated “by‑transfer” appointments from ministerial/gazetted staff to Munsif‑Magistrate posts as inconsistent with the Bar experience requirement.
4. Fourth AIJA (2002): Dispensed with the minimum practice requirement altogether, permitting fresh law graduates to compete, combined with mandatory one‑year training. Importantly, it:
   1. Introduced LDCE as an avenue of accelerated promotion from lower rungs, and
   1. Fixed the composition of District Judge cadre at 50:25:25 for RPs:LDCEs:DRs, with seniority at entry determined through a 40‑point roster, drawing support from R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab.
5. Fifth AIJA (2010): Observing large numbers of unfilled LDCE vacancies, the Court reduced the LDCE quota from 25% to 10%, altering the ratio to 65:10:25 for RPs:LDCEs:DRs.
6. Sixth AIJA (2025): Very recently, the Constitution Bench has restored the 50:25:25 ratio, and substantially revamped the framework for accelerated promotion from Junior Division to Senior Division and onward to the HJS, including re‑introducing the requirement of three years’ Bar practice for recruitment at the lowest rung and expanding fast‑track promotion mechanisms.

In parallel, in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, the Court permitted judicial officers to compete in direct recruitment to HJS and count their judicial service for eligibility, effectively opening another accelerated channel for promotees.

Against this complex background, the present application focuses on a more specific but structurally crucial question:

“What should be the criteria for determining seniority in the cadre of Higher Judicial Services?”^[1]

The Interlocutory Application: Claims of “Heartburn” and Proposals

The learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, highlighted what he termed an “anomalous situation”: in many States, officers who enter as Civil Judges at a relatively young age often do not reach the post of Principal District Judge, let alone elevation to the High Court, whereas direct recruits from the Bar allegedly progress faster. This, it was argued, dissuades bright young law graduates from joining as Civil Judges and generates “heartburn” among promotees who have served for long in the lower judiciary.^[1]

Proposals by the Amicus

To address this perceived imbalance and to improve the position of RPs and LDCEs vis‑à‑vis DRs, the Amicus suggested four broad options:

1. 1:1 quota for appointment to Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within HJS as between promotees and DRs.
2. Equal zone of consideration: while filling Selection Grade and Super Time Scale, equal numbers from DRs and promotees should be brought within the zone of consideration (even if not an equal number are finally selected).
3. Weightage for prior service: grant one year of seniority for every five years of completed service in the lower judiciary (subject to a cap of three years), essentially reviving a Shetty Commission recommendation.
4. Separate seniority lists: maintain three separate seniority lists in the HJS (for RPs, LDCEs, DRs) in the ratio 50:25:25, akin to the suggestion from the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Responses from States, Union Territories and High Courts provided data and rules relating to promotions and seniority, revealing wide diversity of practices and no uniform pattern of DR dominance.

Competing Perspectives: Promotees vs Direct Recruits

Promotees (RPs and LDCEs)

RPs, supported largely by LDCE officers, advanced several contentions:

• Age and progression disadvantage: DRs typically enter the HJS at a younger age, giving them more time to reach Selection Grade, Super Time Scale, assume administrative posts such as Principal District Judge, and potentially be elevated to the High Court.
• Superiority of judicial experience: service as Civil Judge (Junior and Senior Division) should be treated as qualitatively superior to experience at the Bar, and must be recognised for seniority and career progression in HJS, relying on interpretations of Rejanish K.V..
• “Heartburn” from younger DRs: induction of younger DRs above long‑serving judicial officers is said to create a deep sense of grievance and demotivation.
• For LDCEs specifically:
  • earlier judicial service for RPs and LDCEs should be treated alike;
  • unfilled LDCE vacancies in a given year should be carried forward and not converted to RPs, with corresponding seniority protection;
  • roster positions should be preserved even if sufficient vacancies do not arise in a particular year.

Direct Recruits (DRs)

On the other side, DRs opposed any preferential regime for promotees:

• State‑specific variation: data showed that in some States RPs hold key positions; in others DRs are more prominent. Hence, there is no uniform all‑India “malady” of DR dominance justifying central judicial restructuring.
• High Court’s primacy: under Articles 233–235, High Courts are constitutionally tasked with control over subordinate courts and are best placed to fix seniority arrangements based on local circumstances and statistics.
• Birthmark doctrine: once officers enter the HJS and seniority on entry is fixed via the roster in proportion to their quota, the source of recruitment becomes irrelevant. Later promotions, Selection Grade, Super Time Scale, and administrative assignments must be based on merit‑cum‑seniority within the HJS, not on prior service in the feeder posts.
• Roster preservation: where annual vacancies are insufficient, roster positions should be preserved, not redistributed across streams.

High Courts, represented through senior counsel, broadly aligned with one or the other standpoint, but collectively emphasised preserving the merit‑cum‑seniority principle within the HJS and cautioned against creating new artificial classifications based on the past service profile of incumbents.

Constitutional Framework: Supreme Court’s Power vs High Court Control

A substantial part of the judgment addresses whether the Supreme Court should, at all, issue mandatory central guidelines on seniority within HJS given the constitutional role of High Courts under Articles 233–235.

High Court Control and Article 309

The Court revisits two seminal Constitution Bench decisions:

• B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana: While State legislatures/Governors may frame laws/rules under Article 309 regulating judicial recruitment and service conditions, such rules cannot infringe the control of the High Court under Article 235.
• State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah: Legislative/Executive power to regulate recruitment and service is always subject to High Court’s superintendence in matters of the subordinate judiciary.

The Court affirms that, as a matter of constitutional structure, High Courts must be consulted in framing recruitment and seniority rules and their primacy in matters of control over district judiciary remains intact.

Supreme Court’s Mandate under Articles 32, 141 and 142

At the same time, the Court reiterates that it is not constitutionally barred from laying down uniform national guidelines for judicial service structure using its powers under Articles 32, 141, and 142. This is precisely what it has done in the AIJA series and in cases like Rejanish K.V. and Malik Mazhar Sultan to strengthen the judiciary, achieve a reasonable uniformity, and preserve judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

The present directions are thus framed as a homogenous framework within which each High Court still retains operational control and can devise detailed modalities in its own statutory rules.

The “Heartburn” Argument and Loss of Birthmark

Re‑assessment of “Heartburn”

The Bench carefully analyses the alleged “heartburn” among promotees:

• Rejanish K.V. did not elevate judicial experience above Bar experience; it merely held that judicial experience is not inferior to Bar practice and can be counted for eligibility to compete as DRs.
• Recent decisions like R. Poornima v. Union of India have, in fact, placed DRs (especially Bar entrants) at a disadvantage because they must complete ten years as judicial officers before consideration for elevation as High Court judges, whereas RPs/LDCEs can count both their lower judicial and HJS service.
• The service conditions and age profiles have undergone several shifts over the last three decades (e.g., changing Bar experience norms, fresh graduate entry, reintroduction of three‑year experience), making any static assessment of imbalance unreliable.

Crucially, the Court holds that mere subjective discontent or heartburn, without a concrete legal injury, illegality, or legitimate expectation, cannot justify creating a new classification or preferential regime within a cadre.^[1]

The Doctrine of Non‑Retention of Birthmark

The Court then turns to core service jurisprudence on inter se seniority and source‑based classifications:

• Mervyn Coutinho v. Collector of Customs and Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India: In a common cadre formed from multiple sources, once officers are integrated, seniority in higher grades is determined by continuous service in that grade; the source of original entry is not a valid basis for differential treatment.
• State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa: While a classification based on educational qualification was upheld as reasonably related to administrative efficiency, the Court reiterated that mere difference in source of recruitment cannot justify treating persons unequally once they form one cadre.
• Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, and later cases like State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath Dey and Ram Janam Singh v. State of U.P.: Seniority generally flows from the date of regular appointment in accordance with rules; ad‑hoc or stop‑gap appointments cannot claim parity with regular appointees.

Synthesising these authorities, the Court holds that, in the context of HJS, once officers from the three sources (RPs, LDCEs, DRs) are appointed to the common cadre of District Judges and inter se seniority at entry is assigned through the roster, they lose the birthmark of their source. Any attempt to again classify or favour them later in the same cadre based on length of prior judicial service would offend Articles 14 and 16 and distort settled principles of service law.

The Court therefore emphatically rejects using earlier service as Civil Judge (Junior/Senior Division) as a valid intelligible differentia for preferential promotion, selection to higher grades, or administrative assignments within the HJS. Merit‑cum‑seniority within the HJS itself must prevail.

The New Seniority Framework: Annual 4‑Point Roster

The judgment’s most operative part is the crafting of a uniform, mandatory seniority mechanism for the HJS. While earlier AIJA directions approved a 40‑point roster, States have adopted divergent rosters and priority orders for RPs, LDCEs and DRs, resulting in non‑uniformity.

The 4‑Point Roster (2 RPs : 1 LDCE : 1 DR)

To harmonise the system nationwide while preserving the basic 50:25:25 composition ratio, the Court prescribes:

• An annual 4‑point roster for every recruitment year.
• The roster cycles in the following fixed sequence:
  • Regular Promotee (RP)
  • Regular Promotee (RP)
  • LDCE promotee
  • Direct Recruit (DR)
• The sequence repeats until all appointees for that recruitment year are accommodated in that year’s roster.

Seniorities within each year are thus fixed by roster position, without regard to the exact date of appointment as long as appointments occur within the stipulated temporal window.

Annual Character of the Roster and Timing of Appointments

The Court clarifies that the seniority roster is annual and is intended to function in tandem with the recruitment timelines laid down in Malik Mazhar Sultan for HJS and lower courts.

• If recruitment from all three sources is initiated in Year A and appointments from all sources are completed in Year A itself, all such appointees are placed in the Annual Roster of Year A according to their roster points, regardless of the precise date of joining within the year.
• Exception for delayed appointments: If, for example, DR selection initiated in Year A is completed and DRs are appointed only in Year A+1 (due to evaluation delays, litigation, etc.), those DRs may still be placed in the Year A roster, provided:
  • They are appointed before any appointments are made from any source in respect of recruitment initiated for Year A+1.

Beyond this narrowly tailored exception, the Court reaffirms that continuous length of service within the HJS, adjusted by roster positioning for each recruitment year, is the governing criterion for inter se seniority.

Non‑Initiation of Recruitment in a Given Year

If, in any given year, recruitment from a particular source is not initiated at all, officers subsequently appointed from that source cannot be retrospectively fitted into the roster of that earlier year. They will instead obtain seniority only in the year in which their recruitment process is actually concluded and appointment made.

Treatment of Unfilled DR/LDCE Vacancies

The Court addresses the practical necessity of avoiding long‑standing vacancies in the HJS:^[1]

• Where, after completing recruitment for a particular year, vacancies in the DR or LDCE quotas remain unfilled due to non‑availability of suitable candidates, those vacancies must be filled in the same recruitment year through regular promotions from Civil Judge (Senior Division) according to the applicable rules.
• Such additional RPs will be placed in the same annual roster for that year, but only against subsequent RP positions, not by occupying the roster positions earmarked for LDCEs or DRs.^[1]
• In the following recruitment year, the computation of vacancies to be filled from each source must again apply the 50:25:25 ratio to the entire cadre, reflecting the continuing nature of quota implementation.

This mechanism preserves both the cadre‑level ratio and the need to keep courts adequately staffed, while preventing a promotee from claiming DR/LDCE roster positions simply because of a diversion of unfilled vacancies.

Data, Demographics and Rejection of Weightage Proposals

The Court expressly finds that data produced by various High Courts and States does not support the broad narrative of systemic subordination of promotees:

• In some jurisdictions, RPs hold a majority of key HJS positions, which is natural given that they constitute three‑fourths of the cadre under the 50:25:25 framework.
• The age of entry, minimum Bar experience, and pace of promotion from Junior to Senior Division and then to HJS have oscillated over the decades, creating a fluid demographic picture rather than a stable “malady” requiring nationwide correction.

On this basis, the Court rejects the Amicus’s four proposals:

1. 1:1 quota in higher scales (Selection Grade/Super Time Scale): This is viewed as undermining merit‑cum‑seniority, creating artificial parity where none is warranted, and disincentivising those who have reached HJS through competitive avenues like LDCE or direct recruitment.
2. Equal zone of consideration at 50:50: Would distort merit‑based assessment and generate new inequities, particularly against officers who entered the HJS through more competitive channels.
3. Three‑year seniority weightage for long lower‑court service: Would unjustly prejudice DRs and create a perverse incentive structure; prior lower‑court service has already served its role in enabling promotion to HJS and cannot again be used to tilt seniority within HJS.
4. Separate seniority lists for the three streams: Would fracture the common cadre principle, produce enduring inequalities, and run counter to the doctrine that once integrated, officers lose the birthmark of their source.

The Court warns that importing lower‑cadre service length into HJS seniority would be “counter‑productive”, sacrificing merit and eroding the efficient administration of justice.

Key Conclusions and Directions

Invoking Article 142, the Constitution Bench summarises its holdings and directions, of which the most important are:

1. No classification based solely on “heartburn”: Mere perceived discontent of promotees, absent a clear legal wrong or legitimate expectation, cannot justify creating an artificial classification or preference within a common cadre.
2. Data does not disclose a pan‑India malady: No uniform pattern of DR dominance or systemic denial of promotion to promotees exists across all States that would mandate centralised judicial restructuring.
3. Promotee predominance in many States is natural: Given that RPs constitute about three‑fourths of the HJS posts, their strong representation in key positions is expected and not a sign of imbalance.
4. Loss of birthmark on entry to HJS: Once recruited into HJS and assigned seniority through the annual roster, all incumbents lose the tag of RP/LDCE/DR for the purposes of further progression; only service within HJS and merit‑cum‑seniority are relevant thereafter.
5. Selection Grade and Super Time Scale: Fixation in these higher scales is to be based solely on merit‑cum‑seniority within HJS; prior performance or length of service as Civil Judge in lower cadres has no continuing relevance.
6. Lower‑cadre experience not a valid intelligible differentia: Length and performance as Civil Judge do not constitute a permissible basis for classifying or preferring officers in the common cadre of District Judges, unlike the educational‑qualification based classification upheld in Triloki Nath Khosa.
7. Individual ambition cannot shape service rules: Personal career aspirations, though natural, cannot determine the design of seniority rules where the constitutional objective is to secure an independent and efficient judiciary.
8. Multiple accelerated avenues already exist for promotees: Through Rejanish K.V. (permitting them to compete as DRs) and the Sixth AIJA (fast‑track promotions), promotees enjoy significant opportunities for quicker advancement, reducing the force of any grievance.
9. Annual 4‑point roster as the governing mechanism: Seniority within HJS shall be determined by an annual roster repeating the sequence 2 RPs, 1 LDCE, 1 DR for all appointees in that year.
10. Back‑dating in limited circumstances only: Officers appointed in the year after initiation of recruitment may still be adjusted in the earlier year’s roster only if recruitment from no source in the subsequent year has yet resulted in appointments.
11. No retrospective seniority where recruitment not initiated: If recruitment from a source is not initiated in a given year, later appointees from that source cannot claim seniority for that year; they are slotted into the year of actual appointment.
12. Diversion of unfilled DR/LDCE vacancies: Such vacancies, after completion of recruitment, may be filled by RPs in the same year, but those RPs will occupy only subsequent RP roster positions, and future vacancies must still be computed on the 50:25:25 basis applied to the cadre as a whole.
13. Mandatory amendment of State rules: All States and Union Territories are directed to amend their statutory HJS rules, in consultation with the respective High Courts, within three months to incorporate the guidelines of this judgment and prescribe the precise modalities of implementing the annual roster.
14. Prospective nature and non‑disturbance of settled seniority: The judgment expressly clarifies that it is not meant to reopen or unsettle existing inter se seniorities already determined; the guidelines are to govern going forward, with the possibility of future reconsideration once the full impact of Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA reshapes the composition of HJS.

Significance and Implications

This judgment is notable on several counts. First, it consolidates the birthmark doctrine in the context of judicial services, making it clear that once officers enter a common cadre like HJS, historical differences in their career path cannot be used to engineer fresh inequities or parallel hierarchies. Second, it standardises seniority determination nationwide through a simple and replicable 4‑point annual roster, thereby reducing scope for divergent State practices that might undermine uniformity and judicial independence.

Third, the Court balances institutional objectives against individual aspirations. While acknowledging the legitimate frustrations of long‑serving promotees, it refuses to allow subjective “heartburn” to reconfigure the legal architecture of service jurisprudence or to dilute merit‑based advancement norms central to the credibility and effectiveness of the judiciary.

Finally, by expressly keeping open the possibility of revisiting these directions in light of evolving data and the structural reforms already underway through Rejanish K.V. and the Sixth AIJA, the Bench recognises that judicial service design is a dynamic, not static, field. For the present, however, the judgment draws a clear line: seniority and higher‑grade placements within the Higher Judicial Services must be rooted in a common cadre logic, regulated by a uniform roster, and guided by merit‑cum‑seniority rather than by retrospective reward for earlier service in the lower ranks.