The Unnao Case Judgment: Delhi HC Dismisses Suspension of Sentence in a High-Profile Crime of Violence Against Rape Victim’s Family

The Unnao Case Judgment: Delhi HC Dismisses Suspension of Sentence in a High-Profile Crime of Violence Against Rape Victim’s Family

Kuldeep Singh Senger v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Appeal No. 539/2020

High Court of Delhi | Judgment dated: 19 January 2026 | Justice Ravinder Dudeja

Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s recent judgment in Kuldeep Singh Senger v. Central Bureau of Investigation is a landmark decision that reinforces the judiciary’s commitment to victim protection and accountability in heinous crimes. The judgment, delivered by Justice Ravinder Dudeja on 19 January 2026, dismisses the appellant’s application for suspension of sentence and bail during the pendency of his criminal appeal. This case, arising from the infamous Unnao incidents, exemplifies the judicial system’s response to organized violence against vulnerable victims and their families[1].

The judgment is significant not only for its substantive legal holdings but also for its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for victims and the proper application of post-conviction bail jurisprudence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Factual Background: A Tale of Systemic Violence

The Initial Rape and Assault

The prosecutorial narrative unfolds across a timeline of grave offences spanning from June 2017 to April 2018. On 04 June 2017, a minor daughter of Surender Singh (alias Pappu Singh) was enticed under the false pretext of employment and brought to the house of the appellant, Kuldeep Singh Senger. There, she was subjected to rape—an act that would set off a chain of retaliatory violence designed to intimidate her family and obstruct justice[1].

The case takes a darker turn on 03 April 2018. When Surender Singh and his colleague Kishore were travelling to Unnao for the court hearing in their daughter’s rape case, they were brutally assaulted in broad daylight in village Makhi, Unnao, allegedly by the appellant and his associates. This assault was no random act of violence; it was a calculated intimidation tactic aimed at preventing the victim’s family from pursuing the rape prosecution.

The Fabricated FIR and Death in Custody

Following the assault, an FIR No. 89/2018 was registered on the complaint of Shailendra Singh, falsely alleging that Surender Singh was found in possession of illegal firearms—a country-made pistol and four cartridges. This fabricated charge, compounded with his severe injuries from the assault, led to his arrest and detention in judicial custody.

Tragically, on 09 April 2018, Surender Singh succumbed to multiple injuries sustained during the assault. His death in judicial custody, following a false implication, represents a profound failure of the state apparatus to protect a citizen exercising his fundamental right to seek justice. The next day, FIR No. 90/2018 was registered on the complaint of the deceased’s wife, alleging that the appellant and his associates had assaulted him, attempted to molest her minor daughters, and exerted political pressure to shield the assailants[1].

Judicial Transfer and Investigation: The Supreme Court’s Intervention

Recognizing the gravity and sensitivity of the case, both FIRs were transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which re-registered them as RC No. 9(S)/2018 and RC No. 10(S)/2018. The CBI conducted an extensive investigation involving the recording of statements from several independent witnesses and detailed analysis of call-detail records.

A crucial intervention came from the Supreme Court, which transferred all trials arising out of these incidents from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi vide order dated 01 August 2019, passed in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) 01/2019. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court directed that the victim, her family members, and their lawyer be provided CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) protection—a directive that continues in force to this day[1]. This protection order itself is an eloquent statement about the threat perception and the precarious safety of the victim’s family.

Conviction and Sentencing: The Trial Court’s Decision

Following detailed trial proceedings before the District and Sessions Judge, West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, the trial court delivered its judgment on 04 March 2020, convicting the appellant for multiple serious offences. The conviction was for offences under Sections 166, 167, 193, 201, 203, 211, 218, 323, 341, 304 of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act, 1959.

Sentencing Structure

On 13 March 2020, the trial court imposed a comprehensive sentence:

• Section 120B (Criminal Conspiracy): Five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,00,000
• Section 193 (Giving Fabricated Evidence): Seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000
• Section 201 (Destruction of Evidence): Two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000
• Section 203 (Giving Perjured Evidence): Two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000
• Section 211 (Framing an Innocent Person): Seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000
• Section 323 (Voluntarily Causing Hurt): One year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000
• Section 341 (Wrongful Restraint): One month rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500
• Section 304 Part (ii) (Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder): Ten years rigorous imprisonment and compensation of Rs. 10,00,000 to be paid to the heirs of the deceased

All sentences were to run concurrently, making the substantive sentence ten years rigorous imprisonment[1].

The trial court also convicted the appellant in a connected case for the rape of the minor victim under Sections 5 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act read with Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing him to life imprisonment.

The Present Application: Bail During Appeal

After his conviction, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal No. 539/2020 challenging the trial court judgment. Pending the hearing of this appeal, he filed a bail application (CRL.M. 2050/2024) under Section 430 read with Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Surksha Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking suspension of his sentence and release on bail during the pendency of the appeal.

Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant

The appellant’s senior counsel, Mr. Manish Vashisht, presented a multi-pronged argument seeking relief:

1. Prolonged Incarceration

The counsel emphasized that the appellant had been in continuous custody since 13 April 2018—a period of approximately 7.5 years at the time of the application. According to the nominal roll, this constitutes more than half of the total awarded sentence of 10 years. The submission was that such prolonged incarceration warranted suspension of the remaining sentence[2].

2. Clean Conduct Record

It was argued that during the entire period of incarceration, there was not a single adverse report or complaint regarding the appellant’s conduct from jail authorities or any other agency, demonstrating his reformation and suitability for release.

3. Compliance with Bail Conditions

The counsel drew attention to four occasions on which the appellant was granted interim bail. On each occasion, he allegedly adhered strictly to the conditions imposed by the court and did not misuse the liberty granted to him in any manner.

4. Absence of Threat Perception

Crucially, the counsel argued that there was no finding by any court that the appellant had threatened the victim or family members. The argument proceeded on the premise that the prosecution had failed to place on record any material suggesting that the release of the appellant would pose a threat to the victim or witnesses. The counsel further submitted that during arguments, the CBI did not contend that any threat would materialize if the sentence were suspended, and the absence of such an assertion indicated that threat perception was “unfounded and speculative”[2].

5. Appeal Becoming Infructuous

Finally, it was submitted that the appeal is unlikely to be heard in the near future and continued incarceration despite having undergone a substantial portion of the sentence would cause grave and irreparable prejudice, potentially rendering the appeal infructuous.

Arguments on Behalf of the State and the Victim

The prosecution and the victim’s counsel presented a stronger counterargument:

1. Gravity of Offences and Role of the Appellant

The Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI opposed the application, emphasizing that the appellant was a central and pivotal figure in the commission of the offence and had been convicted after proper appreciation of evidence by the trial court[2].

2. Connected Rape Conviction

The counsel appearing on behalf of the victim, Mr. Mehmood Pracha, emphasized that the appellant stands convicted not only for the assault on the deceased but also for the rape of the minor daughter under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(c) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The father, now deceased, was the principal witness in that rape prosecution.

3. Causal Nexus Between Rape and Assault

It was submitted that the present case was “a direct and brutal offshoot of the rape case,” meaning that the assault, murder, and falsification of records were coordinated attempts to obstruct justice in the rape prosecution and intimidate the victim’s family.

4. Previous Rejection by Coordinate Bench

The victim’s counsel drew attention to the fact that a similar application for suspension of sentence had already been dismissed by a Coordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court vide judgment dated 07 June 2024 after detailed appreciation of evidence. It was argued that no new circumstance had emerged since that rejection[2].

5. Political Influence and Threat Perception

The counsel submitted that the appellant’s political influence and stature create a real and substantive apprehension of interference with witnesses and the administration of justice should he be released. The threat perception is not mere speculation but grounded in: (a) the organized nature of the violence; (b) the fabrication of the FIR against the deceased; (c) the continued attempts to remove CRPF security from the victim and her family through applications before the Supreme Court; and (d) the Supreme Court’s own assessment of the threat, reflected in its directions for continued CRPF protection[2].

6. Grave Nature of Crime and Societal Impact

Drawing upon the findings of the Coordinate Bench, the counsel emphasized the grave nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and its deep societal impact. These considerations, it was argued, cannot be lightly disregarded at the bail suspension stage.

Legal Framework and Judicial Principles

Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

The cornerstone of the court’s analysis is Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which governs the suspension of sentences pending appeal. The section provides a discretionary power to courts to suspend the execution of a sentence and release the convict on bail pending the disposal of the appeal[1].

The Critical Distinction: Post-Conviction vs. Pre-Conviction Bail

Justice Dudeja drew upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123, to establish that once a conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence stands dissolved. Consequently, the principles governing pre-conviction bail cannot be mechanically applied to post-conviction suspension. Section 389 envisages “a distinct and more restrictive standard,” requiring courts to consider:

1. The prima facie sustainability of the conviction
2. The gravity of the offence
3. Other relevant factors[1]

This distinction is fundamental: post-conviction bail operates within a dramatically different legal framework than pre-conviction bail. The burden shifts significantly once guilt has been established through due process.

Standards for Sentences of Ten Years or More

The court relied heavily on Atul Tripathi v. State of U.P., (2014) 9 SCC 177, wherein the Supreme Court summarized the legal principles governing suspension of sentence in cases where the punishment is ten years or more. The principles mandate that before considering release, the court must examine:

1. The gravity of the offence
2. The nature of evidence
3. The antecedents of the convict
4. The impact on public confidence in the justice system
5. The submissions of the public prosecutor[1]

When applied to the facts of the present case, these factors “weigh heavily against grant of suspension.”

The Delay and Incarceration Test

A crucial principle emerged from Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842. The Supreme Court held that sentence cannot be suspended merely on the ground of incarceration or delay in the appeal process. The court must decide such applications “on their own merits” by objectively considering:

1. The nature of the offence
2. The manner of commission
3. The gravity of the offence
4. The desirability of releasing the convict on bail[1]

Critically, the Supreme Court held that “the mere factum of sufferance of incarceration for a particular period, in a case where life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for invocation of power under Section 389 Cr. P.C. without referring to the relevant factors.” This principle is of considerable importance to the present decision.

The Court further observed that if prolonged incarceration and appeal delay could be standalone grounds for suspension, then “in almost every such case, favourable invocation of said power would become inevitable”—a result inconsistent with the legislative intent and public interest.

The High Court’s Analysis and Judgment

Application of Legal Principles to Established Facts

Justice Dudeja began his analysis by noting that the suspension of sentence is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion requiring judicial application to the circumstances of each case. The nature and gravity of the offence committed are vital considerations[1].

Trial Court’s Findings: Not to be Lightly Disregarded

The court emphasized that the trial court, after detailed appreciation of evidence, had concluded that the appellant was “a key participant in the conspiracy” and that “the assault on the deceased, and the subsequent falsification of FIR, were part of that design.” These findings form the basis of the conviction and “cannot be set aside lightly at the stage of deciding application for suspension of sentence.”

This is an important principle: appellate courts considering suspension do not conduct a full merits review. They accept the trial court’s factual findings as established and examine whether post-conviction considerations justify suspension.

Gravity of the Offence

The court observed that the appellant has been awarded a maximum sentence of ten years for offences including Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). The court noted: “The offence committed is of grave magnitude and has a deep societal impact.”[1]

Criminal Antecedents: The Rape Conviction

A significant factor militating against suspension is the appellant’s criminal antecedents. He stands convicted in a connected case for the rape of a minor, having been sentenced to life imprisonment. The existence of such serious antecedents is described as “a significant consideration” and one that “militates strongly against suspension.”[1]

Supreme Court’s Transfer Order: An Indicator of Threat Perception

The court took judicial notice of the Supreme Court’s own assessment of the threat perception. The transfer of trials from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi, coupled with the direction for CRPF protection of the victim and her family, reflects “the gravity of the threat perception, a factor that remains relevant even at the stage of deciding suspension of sentence.”[1]

Rejecting the “Mere Speculation” Argument

The counsel for the appellant had argued that the threat perception was “unfounded and speculative” because the CBI did not explicitly contend during arguments that release would pose a threat. The court implicitly rejected this argument by reference to:

1. The organized and planned nature of the violence
2. The fabrication of the FIR against the deceased
3. The attempts to remove CRPF security
4. The Supreme Court’s own protective orders[1]

These objective facts, the court found, established a real threat perception grounded in the facts of the case, not mere speculation.

The Coordinate Bench Precedent

The court noted that a similar application had been dismissed by a Coordinate Bench vide judgment dated 07 June 2024 “after due consideration of the arguments of the appellant on merits.” No new circumstance had emerged since that rejection. The judgment observed: “Appellant has not pointed out any prima facie palpable error in the judgment of the Trial Court.”[1]

In the absence of new circumstances or palpable errors in the conviction, re-litigation of the same issues before a different bench would not be warranted.

Distinguishing Incarceration Period from Discretionary Relief

Applying the principle from Shivani Tyagi, the court held: “Prolonged incarceration by itself cannot be a standalone ground for grant of suspension of sentence, particularly where no new circumstance has arisen subsequent to the earlier rejection of suspension.”[1]

The fact that the appellant has undergone 7.5 years out of a 10-year sentence was found to be relevant but not determinative. The court stated: “The period undergone is relevant but not determinative. When weighed against the gravity of the crime, the threat perception, the appellant’s antecedents, and the nature of the Trial Court’s findings, this factor alone cannot warrant suspension.”[1]

Expedited Hearing as an Alternative Remedy

In a balanced approach, the court acknowledged that the appellant has “suffered long incarceration of about 7.5 years” and that “the appeal could not be heard.” However, the court observed that “reason for such delay in hearing the appeals partly was that appellant filed multiple applications for interim suspension, extension of bail and regular suspension of sentence.”[1]

Rather than granting suspension, the court directed that the appeal be heard on merits in an expeditious manner, which would serve as an effective remedy if the appellate arguments have merit.

Key Holdings and Principles

The judgment establishes several important precedents:

1. Post-Conviction Bail Standards are Substantially Stricter

Once conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence dissolves, and the standards for bail fundamentally change. Courts must apply a substantially more restrictive test than in pre-conviction cases[1].

2. Gravity of Offence is Central to Discretion

The gravity of the offence is not merely one factor among many; it is central to the exercise of discretion under Section 389. In cases involving violence against victims and their families, particularly in the context of obstructing justice, the gravity is heightened[1].

3. Threat Perception is a Legitimate Consideration

The court confirmed that threat to victim, witnesses, and the administration of justice is a legitimate consideration at the post-conviction bail stage. Such threat need not be explicitly stated in each individual case; it can be inferred from the organized and planned nature of the original offences and subsequent conduct[1].

4. Delay and Incarceration Cannot Be Standalone Grounds

The period undergone in incarceration and delay in hearing the appeal are relevant factors but cannot be standalone grounds for suspension, particularly in cases involving serious offences[1].

5. Criminal Antecedents Weigh Heavily

In cases where the convict has prior serious convictions (such as rape and life imprisonment), this substantially militates against post-conviction release on bail.

Implications for Criminal Justice and Victim Protection

1. Strengthening Victim Protection

The judgment reaffirms the constitutional and statutory commitment to victim protection. By refusing to suspend the sentence despite the passage of 7.5 years, the court prioritized the safety and dignity of the victim over the convict’s interest in early release. This sends a clear message that organized violence against victims and their families will not be tolerated or accommodated through post-conviction bail[1].

2. Preventing Organized Intimidation of Witnesses

The case exemplifies how criminal elements may use violence and intimidation to obstruct the course of justice. By refusing suspension where such organized intimidation is established, the court provides a strong deterrent against such practices. The system cannot be allowed to facilitate the release of persons convicted of organizing violence against witnesses[1].

3. Reinforcing the Supreme Court’s Protective Orders

The judgment respects and reinforces the Supreme Court’s assessment of threat perception and its directions for CRPF protection. This ensures consistency and credibility across levels of the judiciary. If lower courts were to suspend sentences in cases where the Supreme Court has ordered protective measures, it would undermine the protective regime[1].

4. Judicial Consistency and Finality

By affirming the Coordinate Bench’s earlier dismissal and declining to re-litigate settled issues, the judgment emphasizes that appellate processes, once concluded on merits, should not be subject to repeated challenges on identical grounds. This promotes finality and judicial efficiency[1].

5. Setting Appropriate Standards for Serious Crimes

For crimes of this magnitude—rape, conspiracy, fabrication of evidence, culpable homicide, and organized intimidation—the judgment makes clear that mere passage of time and satisfactory conduct during incarceration are insufficient for early release. This appropriately signals the seriousness with which the system treats such crimes.

Critical Analysis: Potential Counterarguments

While the judgment is legally sound and principled, some potential counterarguments may be noted for academic completeness:

The Right to Speedy Appeal

International human rights standards and constitutional law emphasize the right to a speedy trial and appeal. A convict’s constitutional right to have his appeal heard expeditiously is not negated by the gravity of his crime. The court’s reliance on delay caused by multiple bail applications, while partially valid, may not fully address systemic delays in the appellate process[2].

Rehabilitation and Reformation

The counsel had argued that the appellant showed no adverse conduct during 7.5 years of incarceration. If rehabilitation is an object of sentencing, then demonstrable reformation during incarceration might warrant some consideration. However, the court’s response—that in cases of serious organized crimes against vulnerable victims, threat perception trumps reform considerations—is well-reasoned[1].

Proportionality Review

While the court examined gravity, it did not conduct a detailed proportionality review comparing the offense to the sentence. Such a review might, in extreme cases, warrant reconsideration even post-conviction. However, the 10-year sentence for conspiracy, fabrication of evidence, and culpable homicide does not appear disproportionate[1].

Significance in the Context of the Unnao Case

The Unnao case has been a touchstone for judicial examination of organized crime, political influence in criminal matters, and victim protection. The case has seen several high-profile interventions by the Supreme Court, including the transfer of trials and the imposition of protective measures[1].

This judgment by the Delhi High Court validates the Supreme Court’s assessment of the gravity and organized nature of the crimes. By refusing to suspend the sentence despite significant incarceration, the High Court sends a message that organized violence against rape victims and their families is treated with utmost seriousness by the judiciary.

The case also demonstrates the judiciary’s increasing sensitivity to the plight of victims in sexual crimes and related intimidation. The cumulative effect of multiple serious offences against the victim and her family is appropriately reflected in the harsh sentencing and the refusal to suspend.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Kuldeep Singh Senger v. CBI is a landmark pronouncement on post-conviction bail jurisprudence and victim protection. By dismissing the application for suspension of sentence, Justice Ravinder Dudeja has reinforced several fundamental principles:

First, post-conviction bail operates under substantially stricter standards than pre-conviction bail, reflecting the dissolution of the presumption of innocence upon conviction[1].

Second, the gravity of the offence, particularly when involving organized violence against vulnerable victims and their families, is central to the discretionary exercise under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Third, threat perception grounded in the organized and planned nature of the offences cannot be dismissed as mere speculation, particularly when corroborated by the Supreme Court’s own protective orders[1].

Fourth, prolonged incarceration and appeal delay, while relevant factors, cannot be standalone grounds for suspension in cases involving serious crimes, particularly when no new circumstance has emerged to warrant reconsideration.

Finally, the judgment affirms that the criminal justice system must prioritize the protection of victims and the integrity of the judicial process over the interests of convicts in early release, especially where organized intimidation of witnesses is established[1].

The judgment represents a principled and legally sound application of post-conviction bail jurisprudence. It provides guidance to lower courts and sets important precedents for similar cases involving organized violence, witness intimidation, and obstruction of justice. In doing so, it contributes significantly to the development of victim-centric criminal justice jurisprudence in India.

References

[1] Kuldeep Singh Senger v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Appeal No. 539/2020, High Court of Delhi, Judgment dated 19 January 2026, Justice Ravinder Dudeja.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123, Supreme Court of India.

[4] Atul Tripathi v. State of U.P., (2014) 9 SCC 177, Supreme Court of India.

[5] Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842, Supreme Court of India.