June 2026 was a consequential month for Indian courts, with the Supreme Court and the High Court of Delhi delivering judgments that strengthened fundamental rights, refined procedural safeguards, and clarified important aspects of regulatory and commercial law. The following article surveys the key rulings, with an emphasis on their doctrinal significance and practical impact for litigators, regulators, and rights-holders.<\/a>[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Prajwala v. Union of India<\/em>, the Supreme Court adopted a robust victim\u2011centric approach, holding that rehabilitation of trafficking survivors is not a matter of charity but an integral component of the right to live with dignity under Article 21. The Court issued a comprehensive \u201cVictim Protection Plan\u201d covering pre\u2011rescue, rescue, post\u2011rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration and prosecution stages, coupled with legislative and policy recommendations to plug gaps in India\u2019s anti\u2011trafficking framework.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary and Threat to Endangered Aquatic Wildlife, In re<\/em>, the Court treated protection of ecologically sensitive regions as a \u201ccontinuing constitutional obligation\u201d of the State under Articles 21, 48\u2011A and 51\u2011A(g). Exercising Article 142, it issued sweeping directions to Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh to curb illegal sand mining and ensure effective implementation of environmental safeguards around the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Development agreements and minors\u2019 property<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Shephali Chakraborty v. State of W.B.<\/em>, the Court allowed a mother to give effect to a development agreement involving her minor child\u2019s undivided share in inherited property under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. It reasoned that where a development agreement converts an unproductive undivided interest into tangible residential accommodation and secure monetary benefits demonstrably in the child\u2019s best interests, permission ought to be granted subject to safeguards.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Married daughters and fair price shop \u201cdependent\u201d quota<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P.<\/em>, the Supreme Court quashed the denial of a fair price shop allotment to a married daughter solely on the ground of her marital status. It held that once \u201cdependency\u201d is accepted as the governing criterion, excluding married daughters is irrational and violates Articles 14 and 15(1) by reinforcing gender stereotypes.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Criminal antecedents as a bail factor<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Rajni v. State of Punjab<\/em>, dealing with a mob murder case, the Court set aside regular bail granted to three accused after finding that the High Court had not analysed their distinct roles and criminal antecedents. It emphasised that in extremely grave offences, incarceration period and trial delay cannot be the sole determinants for bail, and that antecedents bear directly on whether an accused will comply with bail conditions and avoid witness intimidation.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Arbitration clause vs consumer fora<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd.<\/em>, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an arbitration clause cannot oust the jurisdiction of consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It clarified that consumer remedies are statutory, \u201cadditional and independent\u201d, and once a complaint is admitted, it cannot be transferred to arbitration under the proviso to Section 12(4); an allottee retains the right to claim compensation for delayed possession even after receiving the flat.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Right to walk on safe footpaths<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Maniyar Iliyaz v. P. Ayyappan<\/em>, arising from the tragic death of a five\u2011year\u2011old, the Supreme Court declared that the \u201cprimary right of movement\u201d under Article 19(1)(d) is the fundamental right to walk. It held that the right to walk on safe, well\u2011demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right, enhancing compensation to the bereaved father and signalling that urban infrastructure and pedestrian safety are constitutional concerns, not mere administrative choices.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Psychological evaluation in custody disputes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora<\/em>, the Court criticised the constitution of a multi\u2011expert psychological panel for a minor in a custody dispute, holding that such arrangements had inadequately considered the child\u2019s emotional security and welfare. Issuing a 20\u2011point guideline, it cautioned against repeated or excessive psychological testing in adversarial custody battles and re\u2011centred the analysis on the child\u2019s best interests.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Compassionate appointment in Haryana rules<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana<\/em>, the Court examined the interplay of Rule 23(1) and Rule 5(1)(f)\u2013(g) of the Haryana scheme governing compassionate benefits. It held that compassionate appointment cannot be kept in abeyance by invoking rules meant for financial assistance, reinforcing that such schemes must be applied in a manner that meaningfully addresses the immediate hardship caused by a government employee\u2019s death.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Recruitment and procedural irregularities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana<\/em>, the Supreme Court treated non\u2011compliance with certain composition requirements of the Board of Directors under the Haryana Service Rules as a curable procedural irregularity rather than a substantive illegality. It held that where advertisement and selection are otherwise fair and transparent, such defects do not render the recruitment void ab initio, and directed reconsideration of appointments by a duly constituted Board.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Facilities for women advocates and young lawyers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Sarika Tyagi v. Union of India<\/em>, a PIL by women advocates highlighting inadequate ladies\u2019 bar rooms and early\u2011career financial hardships, the Supreme Court treated the issues as raising constitutional concerns about equality and access to the profession. Issuing notice, it suggested exploring mechanisms such as a \u201cYoung Lawyers\u2019 Professional Assistance Fund\u201d and made illustrative observations to catalyse stakeholder discussion on improving infrastructure and financial support for young and women lawyers.<\/a>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Right to be forgotten and judicial records<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India<\/em>, the Delhi High Court recognised the right to be forgotten as a constitutionally protected facet of informational privacy under Article 21. Deciding a batch of petitions seeking de\u2011indexing, masking and removal of links to judicial records (including acquittals and matrimonial disputes), Justice Sachin Datta laid down a framework for restricting searchability and masking personal identifiers while balancing open justice with privacy.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Waiver of statutory waiting period in Special Marriage Act<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In SK v. KS<\/em>, a Division Bench held that the one\u2011year waiting period for filing divorce petitions under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 can be waived in cases of \u201cexceptional hardship\u201d. The Court reasoned that where continuation of marriage would merely prolong suffering and all chances of reconciliation are exhausted, rigid insistence on the statutory period would defeat the Act\u2019s purpose and justify judicial waiver.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Personality rights and deepfakes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Akkineni Naga Chaitanya v. <\/em>WWW.SEXVID.XXX<\/em><\/a> & Ors.<\/em>, the Delhi High Court passed an ex parte ad\u2011interim order protecting the Telugu actor\u2019s personality rights. Justice Jyoti Singh restrained websites, sellers and unidentified persons from exploiting his name, image, likeness and voice through pornographic content, AI\u2011generated deepfakes and unauthorised merchandise, reinforcing the Court\u2019s willingness to treat personality rights as enforceable against digital exploitation.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n FIRs in unnatural deaths of young brides<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In SANDEEP @ SUNNY v. State & connected matters<\/em>, the Court expressed strong concern over delays in registering FIRs in cases involving the unnatural deaths of young married women. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma urged that applications seeking directions for FIR registration in dowry\u2011linked deaths be listed and decided with urgency so that investigation is not left unresolved for months.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Assisted Reproductive Technology Act: regulatory, not prohibitory<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In SHEWTA TUTEJA & ANR v. Union of India & Ors.<\/em>, the Delhi High Court held that the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 is fundamentally regulatory and not meant to create insurmountable barriers to parenthood. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav stressed that reproductive rights and access to parenthood, within contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, cannot be reduced to purely technical application of statutory conditions divorced from factual context.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Termination of pregnancy beyond 26 weeks<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Minor R (Thr. Her Father R) v. State & Anr.<\/em>, the Court allowed a 15\u2011year\u2011old rape victim to terminate a pregnancy beyond 26 weeks, relying on a medical board\u2019s opinion that she was fit to undergo the procedure. Vacation Judge Justice Mini Pushkarna directed AIIMS to bear the cost, underscoring the Court\u2019s readiness to authorise late\u2011term abortions where medical evidence and the minor\u2019s welfare strongly support termination.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Delhi riots conspiracy case and document access<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Devangana Kalita v. State<\/em>, the High Court vacated its earlier interim order restraining the trial court from passing final orders on framing charges in the UAPA \u201clarger conspiracy\u201d case relating to the 2020 Delhi riots. At the same time, it allowed inspection of unrelied documents kept in the malkhana, reinforcing fair\u2011trial norms in complex conspiracy prosecutions while permitting the trial to move forward.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Bar Council elections and tampered ballots<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Raman Gandhi v. Bar Council of Delhi & Ors.<\/em>, the Court refused to order fresh elections despite discovery of tampered ballot papers during counting. It upheld the High\u2011Powered Election Supervisory Committee\u2019s decision to recommence counting from second\u2011preference votes, holding that the irregularity did not vitiate the entire electoral process so as to warrant a re\u2011poll.<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Advocate\u2019s professional fees adjustable against compensation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Prem Singh v. C.S. Rathore<\/em>, the Delhi High Court affirmed a decree that both awarded the client recovery of \u20b960,000 and allowed the advocate\u2019s counter\u2011claim for professional fees of \u20b936,000 adjustable against that amount. The Court held that an advocate is entitled to agreed professional fees to be adjusted against compensation, recognising the enforceability of fee arrangements while still protecting clients from overreach.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Binding Heads of Terms and arbitral claims<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Conscient Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Mahesh Kapoor<\/em>, the High Court held that the Heads of Terms (HoT) prima facie constituted a binding commercial arrangement adequate to disclose a bona fide arbitral claim. It ruled that questions of enforceability and specific performance of the HoT are matters for the arbitral tribunal, signalling a pro\u2011arbitration stance that favours referral of disputes to arbitration where a credible written arrangement exists.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Custody and overnight access<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In D v. G<\/em>, the Court set aside a family court order granting a father overnight custody of his minor son, holding that the child requires more time to acclimatise before staying overnight with him. A Division Bench of Justices Tejas Karia and Madhu Jain modified the interim arrangement to better reflect the child\u2019s history and emotional needs, illustrating the preference for gradual transition in contested custody situations.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n CAG audit and show\u2011cause notices to discoms<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Anr v. GNCTD<\/em>, the Delhi High Court refused to quash a show\u2011cause notice proposing a CAG audit of BSES distribution companies. Justice Tejas Karia held that writ petitions challenging mere show\u2011cause notices are ordinarily not maintainable, reaffirming judicial self\u2011restraint at the notice stage and leaving substantive objections to be raised before the authority.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Debarment, natural justice, and public contracts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Grew Energy Private Ltd. v. NTPC Renewable Energy Ltd.<\/em>, the Court set aside an order suspending a solar module manufacturer from future tenders, treating the suspension as akin to debarment. It held that such orders cannot be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing and complying with principles of natural justice, thereby strengthening procedural fairness in blacklisting\u2011type actions by public sector entities.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n CAT jurisdiction and \u201cforum conveniens\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Maheshwar Narayan Sharma & Ors v. M V Babu Svaminath & Ors.<\/em>, the Delhi High Court upheld the Central Administrative Tribunal\u2019s refusal to transfer a service matter from its Ernakulam Bench to Delhi. The Division Bench of Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla held that the \u201cforum conveniens\u201d doctrine cannot override Rule 6(1) of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, which gives primacy to the applicant\u2019s place of posting or the situs of cause of action in determining jurisdiction.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Burdensome writs and tribunal adjournments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In National Institute of Electronics and Information Technology (NIELIT) & Ors. v. Raj Kumar Tripathi & Ors.<\/em>, the Court declined to entertain a writ petition challenging a CAT order that merely adjourned a matter while continuing interim protection. Terming such petitions a burden on its docket, the Division Bench emphasised that approaching the High Court against routine adjournments is unwarranted when the tribunal has already fixed a proximate hearing date with a directive against further adjournment.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Exam model answer keys and judicial review<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Bisen Anshul Kumar v. Union of India & Anr.<\/em>, involving the UPSC Forest Service Examination, the Delhi High Court held that a challenge to the correctness of an official answer key is maintainable and distinct from seeking re\u2011evaluation of answer sheets. It ruled that courts can interfere where suggested answers in the key are patently incorrect, setting aside a CAT order which had dismissed the aspirant\u2019s challenge without examining the key on merits.<\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n This article highlights how, in June 2026, the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court simultaneously deepened rights\u2011based jurisprudence (privacy, reproductive autonomy, pedestrian safety, trafficking rehabilitation) and tightened procedural discipline in areas ranging from bail and recruitment to audits, debarment and examination processes.[4]<\/sup><\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a> Key Supreme Court and Delhi High Court Judgments \u2013 June 2026 June 2026 was a consequential month for Indian courts, with the Supreme Court and the High Court of Delhi delivering judgments that strengthened fundamental rights, refined procedural safeguards, and clarified important aspects of regulatory and commercial law. The following article surveys the key rulings, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":14386,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14136","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-bachelor-laws"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14136","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14136"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14136\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14385,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14136\/revisions\/14385"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14386"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14136"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14136"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14136"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Supreme Court: human dignity and vulnerable groups<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Trafficking survivors and Article 21<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Chambal illegal sand mining: environmental continuing mandamus<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Supreme Court: family law and welfare benefits<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Supreme Court: bail, criminal law, and procedural fairness<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Supreme Court: pedestrian rights and child custody<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Supreme Court: compassionate appointment and recruitment<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Supreme Court: legal profession and infrastructure<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Delhi High Court: privacy, marriage, and personality rights<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Delhi High Court: criminal justice and reproductive rights<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Delhi High Court: riots, elections, and bar governance<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Delhi High Court: contracts, arbitration, and professional fees<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Delhi High Court: custody, service law, and public law constraints<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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