{"id":14838,"date":"2026-10-12T00:19:00","date_gmt":"2026-10-11T18:49:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/?p=14838"},"modified":"2026-10-12T10:09:43","modified_gmt":"2026-10-12T04:39:43","slug":"the-50-most-important-indian-court-judgments-explained","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/the-50-most-important-indian-court-judgments-explained\/","title":{"rendered":"The 50 Most Important Indian Court Judgments Explained"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The 50 Most Important Indian Court Judgments Explained<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
#<\/th>Case Name<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
1<\/td>A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case)<\/td><\/tr>
2<\/td>Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab<\/td><\/tr>
3<\/td>Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra<\/td><\/tr>
4<\/td>Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab<\/td><\/tr>
5<\/td>BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
6<\/td>Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
7<\/td>Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar<\/td><\/tr>
8<\/td>Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan<\/td><\/tr>
9<\/td>D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal<\/td><\/tr>
10<\/td>Daniel Latifi v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
11<\/td>Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai<\/td><\/tr>
12<\/td>Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council<\/td><\/tr>
13<\/td>Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
14<\/td>Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
15<\/td>Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
16<\/td>Gaurav Jain v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
17<\/td>Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar<\/td><\/tr>
18<\/td>I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab<\/td><\/tr>
19<\/td>In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra<\/td><\/tr>
20<\/td>In Re: Death of Sawinder Singh Grover<\/td><\/tr>
21<\/td>Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
22<\/td>Indra Sawhney v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
23<\/td>L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
24<\/td>Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
25<\/td>M\/s Modi Cements Limited v. Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi<\/td><\/tr>
26<\/td>M\/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame<\/td><\/tr>
27<\/td>Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D’costa<\/td><\/tr>
28<\/td>Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
29<\/td>Minerva Mills v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
30<\/td>Mr. X v. Hospital Z<\/td><\/tr>
31<\/td>Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani<\/td><\/tr>
32<\/td>Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia<\/td><\/tr>
33<\/td>Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
34<\/td>Poonam Verma v. Dr. Ashwin Patel<\/td><\/tr>
35<\/td>Parmanand Katara v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
36<\/td>PUCL v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
37<\/td>Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab<\/td><\/tr>
38<\/td>Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra<\/td><\/tr>
39<\/td>S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
40<\/td>Sakshi v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
41<\/td>Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra<\/td><\/tr>
42<\/td>Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty<\/td><\/tr>
43<\/td>Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab<\/td><\/tr>
44<\/td>Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
45<\/td>Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement<\/td><\/tr>
46<\/td>State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat<\/td><\/tr>
47<\/td>State of Rajasthan v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
48<\/td>Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration<\/td><\/tr>
49<\/td>Vincent v. Union of India<\/td><\/tr>
50<\/td>Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(1) A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case), (1976) 2 SCC 521<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

On 25 June 1975, the President, exercising powers under Article 352(1) of the Constitution, proclaimed a grave emergency on the ground that the security of India was threatened by internal disturbances. Two days later, on 27 June 1975, the President invoked Article 359(1) and declared that the right of any person, including a foreigner, to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 \u2014 as well as all pending proceedings for their enforcement \u2014 would remain suspended for the duration of the emergencies proclaimed on 3 December 1971 and 25 June 1975. The Order further stated that it was in addition to, and not in derogation of, any earlier order passed under Article 359(1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 8 January 1976, a further notification under Article 359(1) suspended the right to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19, along with all pending proceedings for that purpose, for the same period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Several illegal detentions followed across the country, and writ petitions were filed in various High Courts. Nine High Courts ruled in favour of the detenus, holding that although Article 21 could not be enforced, the detention order could still be challenged on other grounds \u2014 for example, that it did not comply with the governing Act or was mala fide. The Supreme Court heard the appeals arising from these decisions together and set aside the High Courts’ rulings, upholding both the Presidential Order and the suspension of the said rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arguments<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Before the Supreme Court, the Attorney General argued that Article 21 \u2014 the fundamental right guaranteeing the security of life and personal liberty \u2014 had been suspended. Consequently, the suspension meant that a detenu had no remedy even against an illegal detention; all remedies for securing life and personal freedom ended with the suspension of Article 21.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The detenus, on the other hand, contended that they retained the right to seek a remedy under Article 226 (the High Court’s power to issue writs). In their view, a remedy against illegal detention remained available despite the suspension of Article 21, because Article 226 \u2014 which allows enforcement of any other legal right \u2014 had not been suspended by the Presidential Order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Judgment<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Marking a dark chapter in Indian legal history, the Supreme Court rejected the respondents’ arguments. It held that Article 21 was the sole repository of the right to life and liberty, and that its suspension necessarily suspended all remedies protecting that right under any other law. By construing Article 21 as the sole source of life and personal liberty, the Court denied the detenus every available remedy, holding that any challenge to a detention order for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 was barred by the Presidential Order then in force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The majority went further: even an order of detention could not be challenged on any other ground \u2014 not even if it was mala fide \u2014 leaving the detenu without any remedy against illegal detention. The Court declared:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“In view of the Presidential Order dated June 27th, 1975 no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is based on extraneous considerations.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

With this, the Court closed its doors to any relief whatsoever for persons suffering illegal detention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the Common Man<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Dubbed “a scar on the Indian judiciary,” the judgment exposed the dangers facing the Constitution \u2014 amounting to total anarchy \u2014 when the judicial wing is unwilling to stand firm against violations of the constitutional mandate. Justice Khanna, who delivered the lone dissenting judgment, was widely praised for his integrity and his commitment to justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the next government came to power, the Constitution was amended to provide that Article 21 can never be suspended, even during an emergency. The recurrence of such a situation has thus been prevented by constitutional amendment, ensuring that the right to life and personal liberty cannot be suspended under any circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(2) Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 28 February 1997, the Indian Railways issued a circular providing that reserved candidates promoted at roster points could not claim seniority over senior general candidates who were promoted later. This followed the law laid down by the Supreme Court, which had held that it was “permissible” to provide that reserved candidates promoted at roster points would not be entitled to claim seniority at the promotional level as against senior general candidates promoted later to the same level. It was further held that “it would be open” to the State to provide that when a senior general candidate was later promoted to the level to which a reserved candidate had earlier been promoted, the general candidate would be treated as senior to the reserved candidate at the promotional level as well \u2014 unless, by then, the reserved candidate had received a further promotion to a higher post. Accordingly, the State of Punjab began revising its seniority lists and making further promotions of senior general candidates who had reached the level earlier reached by reserved candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this juncture, another three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the general rule in the Service Rules relating to seniority from the date of continuous officiation would apply even to roster-point promotees, since otherwise there would be discrimination against reserved candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In light of these two contrary decisions, the State was left in a quandary, and the matter was brought before the Supreme Court. The issues framed included:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  • Could roster-point promotees (reserved category) count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation, as against general candidates who were senior to them in the lower category and were promoted later to the same level?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Whether the “catch-up” principle claimed by the general candidates was tenable?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Court’s judgment may be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    • Roster-point promotees (reserved category) could not count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation in the promoted post, as against general candidates who were senior to them in the lower category and were promoted later. Conversely, a senior general candidate at the lower level, if promoted later but before the reserved candidate received a further promotion, would have to be treated as senior at the promotional level to the reserved candidate \u2014 even if the reserved candidate had been promoted to that level earlier.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    • The Apex Court held that the decision in Jagdishlal v. State of Haryana<\/em>, AIR 1997 SC 2366, had reached an incorrect conclusion because it applied a rule of continuous officiation that was never intended to apply to reserved candidates promoted at roster points. There was no conflict between the principles laid down in Union of India v. Virpal Singh<\/em>, (1993) 6 SCC 685, and Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab<\/em>, (1996) 2 SCC 215. In Ajit Singh<\/em>, the Court had considered the validity of a Circular dated 19 July 1969, which expressly declared that “roster points were seniority points.” The decision in Ajit Singh<\/em> was therefore correct.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    • If a senior general candidate at an initial level (say L-3) reached the next level before the reserved candidate (a roster-point promotee) at that next level (L-2) moved further up to a higher level (L-1), then seniority at L-2 had to be modified by placing the general candidate above the roster promotee, reflecting their inter se seniority at L-2. Further promotion to L-1 had to be based on this modified seniority at L-2 \u2014 that is, the senior general candidate of L-3 would remain senior at L-2 to the reserved candidate, even if the latter had reached L-2 earlier.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    • After Ajit Singh<\/em>, it became necessary that where a reserved candidate had been promoted to a higher level (say Level 2) under the reservation quota, and a general category candidate (senior to the reserved candidate at Level 3) was promoted to the same level (Level 2) later, and the reserved candidate was then promoted to the next level (Level 1) disregarding the general category candidate who was promoted to that level later \u2014 in such situations, it became necessary to review the promotion of the reserved candidate to Level 1 and reconsider the same, though without reverting the reserved candidate who had already reached Level 1. As and when the senior reserved candidate was later promoted to Level 4, seniority at Level 4 was also to be re-fixed on the basis of when the reserved candidate at Level 3 would have received his normal promotion, treating him as junior to the senior general candidate at Level 3.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

      For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      After this decision, it is clear that reserved category promotees cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation, as against general candidates who were senior to them in the lower category and were promoted later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      (3) Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

      Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The respondent was removed from his post as an employee of the appellant Council after the relevant disciplinary authorities found him guilty of sexually harassing X, a junior female employee. He filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging his dismissal. A Single Judge allowed the petition, holding that the dismissal was unjustified on the ground that the respondent had merely tried<\/em> to molest X and had not actually established any physical contact with her. The appellant was ordered to be reinstated, and a Division Bench of the High Court upheld that order. The dismissing organisation then challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Supreme Court held as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \n
      1. In the absence of any procedural irregularity, the High Court was wrong to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary authorities and with the punishment they had imposed. It is a well-settled principle that, in exercising the power of judicial review, the court is not concerned with the correctness of findings of fact that are reasonably supported by evidence, but with the decision-making process itself.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      2. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination projected through direct or implied unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. It is aggravated when submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by a female employee affects her employment, unreasonably interferes with her performance at work, or creates an intimidating or hostile working environment for her.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      3. Every incident of sexual harassment in the workplace is incompatible with the dignity and honour of women and violates the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty. The Apex Court observed:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
        \n

        “Each incident of sexual harassment at the place of work results in violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and the right to life and liberty \u2014 the two most precious fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The contents of the fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution are of sufficient amplitude to encompass all facets of gender equality, including prevention of sexual harassment and abuse, and the courts are under a constitutional obligation to protect and preserve those fundamental rights. That sexual harassment of a female at the place of work is incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female and needs to be eliminated, and that there can be no compromise with such violations, admits no debate.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          \n
        1. Rejecting outright the stand taken by the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the respondent’s behaviour did not cease to be outrageous merely for want of physical contact. The High Court’s observations \u2014 that the respondent did not actually molest X because he had not established such contact with her \u2014 were highly unacceptable.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
        2. Consequently, the Apex Court held that the respondent’s conduct offended against morality, decency and X’s modesty. It constituted an act unbecoming of the good conduct and behaviour expected of a superior employee, and undoubtedly amounted to sexual harassment. Any reduction in punishment was therefore bound to have a demoralising effect on women employees and would amount to a retrograde step.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

          <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          (4) Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

          Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Bachan Singh was tried, convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai. The High Court confirmed the death penalty imposed on him. Appealing by special leave, he \u2014 along with other prisoners \u2014 challenged the constitutional validity of the death penalty provided under the Section, as well as the sentencing procedure laid down in Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Appellant argued that the imposition of the death penalty under Section 302 of the IPC, read with Section 354(3) of the CrPC, was arbitrary and unreasonable because: (a) it was cruel and inhuman, disproportionate and excessive; (b) it was wholly unnecessary and served no social purpose nor advanced any constitutional value; and (c) the discretion conferred on the court to award the death penalty was not guided by any policy or principle laid down by the legislature, but was wholly arbitrary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The State defended the provision on the ground that the question of the constitutional validity of the death penalty had already been concluded by the decision of a Constitution Bench of five Judges in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.<\/em>, AIR 1973 SC 947, and therefore could not be re-agitated. It was further submitted that: (a) the death penalty was neither cruel nor inhuman, neither disproportionate nor excessive; (b) it did serve a social purpose, inasmuch as it fulfilled two penological goals \u2014 denunciation by the community and deterrence; and (c) the judicial discretion in awarding the death penalty was not arbitrary, as the court could always evolve standards or norms to guide the exercise of its discretion in this punitive area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Apex Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 302 of the IPC insofar as it provided for the death sentence, and also dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 354(3) of the CrPC. The Court propounded the principle of the “rarest of rare cases”<\/strong> in the awarding of the death penalty. It observed that a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulated a resistance to taking a life through the instrumentality of law. However, that ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases, when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. The constitutionality of the provisions imposing the death penalty was accordingly upheld.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The Apex Court laid down the doctrine of the “rarest of rare case”<\/strong> for the purpose of awarding the death penalty. The case thus laid a strong foundation for identifying an extraordinary case with prevailing special circumstances, in which the death penalty may be imposed on the accused, his case being one of the rarest of rare. A significant limitation on the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty thus solidified in the form of the “rarest of rare” principle, which has now become the yardstick for awarding the death penalty in the Indian judiciary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          (5) BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

          Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          During the course of the ongoing economic reforms, the Public Sector Disinvestment Commission advised the Government of India that BALCO, a Government company, needed to be privatised by transferring 40% of its shares immediately and reducing its holding to 26% within two years, with the aim of fully disinvesting its stake in favour of investors at the appropriate time. The recommendation was later revised so that 51% of the Government’s stake in BALCO would be transferred, along with a transfer of management. This was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Advertisements were accordingly issued and a detailed process followed, resulting in the selection of M\/s Sterling Co. as the Strategic Partner, to whom the Government’s 51% stake would be transferred for \u20b9551 crores. Discussions also took place in the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha, where a motion to disapprove the proposed disinvestment failed. The transfer of stake was then challenged before the Supreme Court and various High Courts. Clubbing the claims together, the Court framed the following issues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            \n
          • Whether executive policies are reviewable by the judiciary?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
          • Whether the decision to disinvest BALCO is constitutionally valid?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Those challenging the disinvestment argued that: (a) by reason of disinvestment, the workmen had lost their rights and protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and since this was an adverse civil consequence, they had a right to be heard before and during the process of disinvestment; and (b) normally, in cases of this nature, 5% of the shares were disinvested in favour of the employees, which was not done in the present case. The disinvestment was therefore unsustainable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            In reply, it was argued that: (a) public sector companies were constantly sinking into increasing difficulties, and it was in the public interest to disinvest them; and (b) the wisdom and advisability of the Government’s economic policies are not amenable to judicial review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The Apex Court held that: (a) it could not look into the executive wisdom behind a policy, especially in matters regarding economic management; and (b) the legal challenges made to the disinvestment of BALCO were not valid, and consequently, the decision to disinvest BALCO was constitutionally valid. The reasons given by the Apex Court were as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n
            • Non-government employees working in a company cannot claim a superior right than a government servant, nor can they impugn its change of status in terms of social security measures and the protection of their employment and rights.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
            • In taking a policy decision in economic matters, the principles of natural justice have no role to play; they would not require a hearing of the workers prior to decision-making.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
            • When the Government chooses to run an industry by forming a company, and becomes its shareholder, then under the provisions of the Companies Act it has, as a shareholder, a right to transfer its shares.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              In the course of delivering this judgment, the Court came down heavily on frivolous Public Interest Litigations (PILs). In fact, this case set the trend for the in limine dismissal of PILs where the petitioners are unable to establish that a substantial public interest is involved. The Court also declared that public interest is the paramount consideration in national governance. Therefore, if in the public interest the Government thought it fit to take over a sick company to preserve the productive unit and the jobs of those employed therein, the Government may do so, reducing the continuing drain on its limited resources. This decision is in tune with the growing recognition of the efficiencies of the market mechanism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              (6) Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The Petitioner was an organisation dedicated to the cause of releasing bonded labourers. It conducted a survey of stone quarries in the Faridabad District near Delhi and found that a large number of labourers from Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan were working in these stone quarries under “inhuman and intolerable conditions,” and that many of them were bonded labourers. The Petitioner accordingly addressed a letter to the Supreme Court setting out these circumstances and filed a Public Interest Litigation, alleging that hundreds of workmen were living in bondage and under inhuman conditions. The Court appointed a Commissioner to look into the matter within three to four days and to submit a report to the Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Upon receiving the Commissioner’s report, which detailed violations of various constitutional and human rights of the poor labourers, the Apex Court declared that Article 21 of the Constitution assures the right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. It held that the State was under a constitutional obligation to ensure that there was no violation of the fundamental rights of any person, particularly those belonging to the weaker sections of society. The State was bound to ensure observance of the social welfare and labour laws enacted to secure workmen a basic human dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Thereupon, the Apex Court issued a set of 21 guidelines to the Central Government as well as the State Governments to check such gross abuses of citizens’ rights in the future. The Court also appointed a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, as a Commissioner to carry out the task of seeing that the directions were fulfilled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The Court’s concern in securing the release and rehabilitation of the bonded labourers in the present case set the trend in the Court of ensuring that no such violation of the fundamental and human rights of citizens would recur. It is clear now that the Courts in India will not allow anyone to be held in bondage by anyone on account of grave poverty or illness. All citizens have an equal right to survival, and it is the duty of the State to ensure the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n\n\n\n

              (7) Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              This case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC). The provision stated that in certain States where there were Deputy Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners, the State Government could invest the District Magistrate, or any Magistrate of the first class, with the power to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death. Under Section 34, such a Magistrate could try a case and sentence the convict, except to a sentence of death, transportation for a term exceeding seven years, or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              In the appellant’s case, a criminal case was referred to the Deputy Commissioner by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Commissioner, in turn, transferred the file to a Magistrate with powers under Section 30 of the CrPC, and a sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment was imposed on the appellant under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged the said section, but the High Court upheld it. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court for final determination, where the issue was whether Section 30 of the CrPC was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              It was argued before the Court that: (a) a Magistrate under Section 30 is enjoined to try the case before him as a Magistrate and must accordingly follow the warrant procedure, which differs from the procedure followed by a Court of Session. In a Court of Session, the accused was entitled to the benefit of commitment proceedings before a Magistrate and then a trial before the Sessions Judge with the aid of a jury or assessors. This was denied under Section 30, and the provision was therefore violative of Article 14, as there was an infraction of the fundamental right of equality in such cases. (b) The provision was liable to be abused, as it discriminated between persons accused of offences of the same kind, since the police had the discretion of sending a person accused of an offence under a particular Section to a Section 30 Magistrate, or of sending another person accused of the same offence under the same Section to a Magistrate who could commit the accused to the Court of Session.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The Apex Court held that Section 30 of the CrPC did not violate the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, for the following reasons:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n
              • Article 14 does not prohibit a reasonable classification. The only requirement is that the differentia on the basis of which the classification is made must be intelligible, and must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. The Court also held that a classification could be based on geographical or territorial considerations.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
              • The risk of being tried by a Section 30 Magistrate fell alike upon all persons committing such an offence. There was therefore no discrimination in the Section itself.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
              • The discretion to try the offence under Section 30 or otherwise rested with the Magistrate, and not with the police, since it was upon the Magistrate to commit the accused to the Court of Session instead of disposing of the case himself, if he thought that the ends of justice would be met.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
              • In case of any intentional or purposeful discrimination against the appellants by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the District Magistrate, or the Section 30 Magistrate, the law provided for revision by superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate Courts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The importance of this judgment lies in the fact that it establishes that even the judiciary comes within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, for the purposes of enforcing Fundamental Rights; and in case of any infringement of them by the judiciary, the superior courts are entitled to scrutinise such actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n\n\n\n

                (8) Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan, AIR 2003 SC 1867<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                In the initial proceedings, the respondents had approached the High Court of Allahabad through a writ petition, seeking, among other things, the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the appellants to grant a licence for carrying on business as a dealer in birds bred in captivity. The High Court allowed the petition. The decision was then challenged before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The respondent’s contention \u2014 both before the High Court and before the Supreme Court \u2014 was that he had been dealing in birds of several varieties specified in Schedule IV appended to the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, for which he had applied for and been granted a licence. However, his application for renewal of that licence had been rejected. Since there had been no change in the fact situation, he claimed he was entitled to the renewal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The appellants, on the other hand, argued that in view of the amendment made to Section 9 of the Act, whereby “hunting” included “trapping” of birds specified in Schedule IV of the Act, no licence for dealing in them could lawfully be granted. The appellants further stated that although dealing in birds in captivity was not as such prohibited, no licence could be granted under Section 44 of the Act if, by reason of it, the licensee would violate any of the provisions of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The Apex Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that when the hunting of birds was prohibited, there remained no doubt that no person could be granted a licence to deal in birds in captivity which were procured by hunting \u2014 a term that also included trapping. Distinguishing the two situations, the Court observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n

                “It is one thing to say that by reason of breeding of birds in captivity their population increases, but it is another thing to say that birds are trapped before they are made captive so as to enable the licence to deal in them.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                The Court thus concluded that if a finding of fact, having regard to the past transactions of the licensee, showed that the purpose of breeding captive birds was necessarily for hunting, it justified the refusal of a licence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Through this judgment, the Court declared that the “trapping” of birds is an offence. If anyone does it, it is against the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and he can be sent to jail. Also, before granting a licence for dealing in birds, the licensing authority will have regard to the source and manner in which supplies are made, the implications of the licence on hunting and trade, and the past transactions of the licensee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n\n\n\n

                (9) D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 3017<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                A letter was written by the Chief Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, to the Chief Justice of India, referring to certain newspaper reports alleging the mistreatment of prisoners by the police. This letter was treated as a writ petition, and notice was issued to all the State Governments seeking their views on the matter. Thereupon, the Court laid down various guidelines to be observed by the police while securing the arrest of persons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The Apex Court detailed eleven measures to be observed by the police when securing the arrest of an accused. These may be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n
                • The arresting or interrogating official must bear an identification badge.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • A memo of arrest must be prepared in the presence of a family member or a local person.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The arrestee has the right to have his relative or friend informed of his arrest as soon as practicable.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • Details of the arrest must be communicated within 8 to 12 hours to the arrestee’s relative or friend, in case the arrestee lives outside the district or town of arrest.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The arrestee must be told of his right to have someone informed soon after the arrest.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The details of the arrest and the transmission of information to the next friend or relative must be entered in the police diary.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • If the arrestee requests an examination of bodily injuries at the time of arrest, the request must be complied with.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The arrestee must be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during custodial detention.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The arrestee must be permitted to meet his lawyer during investigation, though not necessarily throughout the interrogation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • Copies of all documents seized or procured must be submitted to the Magistrate.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • The police control room of the district or the State Headquarters must notify the fact of arrest on the notice board within 12 hours from the moment of arrest.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  This judgment of the Supreme Court has given sufficient rights and remedies to enable a dignified existence at the time of being imprisoned. The abuse of powers by the police at the time of securing imprisonment has been significantly curtailed by this decision. The Court has, in fact, also directed that any violation of these guidelines shall be considered contempt of court and shall be dealt with accordingly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n\n\n\n

                  (10) Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 3958<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In this case, the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Act had been passed to appease a particular section of society, with the intention of rendering the decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum<\/em> ineffective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In Shah Bano<\/em>, the husband had appealed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which had directed him to pay his divorced wife \u20b9179 per month, enhancing the paltry sum of \u20b925 per month originally granted by the Magistrate. The parties had been married for 43 years before the ill and elderly wife was thrown out of her husband’s residence. For about two years, the husband paid maintenance at the rate of \u20b9200 per month. When these payments ceased, she petitioned under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The husband immediately dissolved the marriage by pronouncing a triple talaq. He paid \u20b93,000 as deferred mahr and a further sum to cover arrears of maintenance and maintenance for the iddat period, and then sought to have the petition dismissed on the ground that she had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Muslim law applicable to the parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The important feature of the case was that the wife had managed the matrimonial home for more than 40 years, had borne and reared five children, and was incapable of taking up any career or of independently supporting herself at that late stage of her life; remarriage was an impossibility in that case. The husband, a successful Advocate with an approximate income of \u20b95,000 per month, provided only \u20b9200 per month to the divorced wife, who had shared his life for half a century, mothered his five children, and was in desperate need of money to survive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The Petitioner argued that: (a) the rationale of Section 125 CrPC was to offset or meet a situation in which a divorced wife was likely to be led into destitution or vagrancy; Section 125 CrPC was enacted to prevent such a situation, in furtherance of the concept of social justice embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution. (b) The object of Section 125 CrPC being to avoid vagrancy, the remedy thereunder could not be denied to a Muslim woman; otherwise it would amount not only to a violation of equality before the law but also of the equal protection of the laws (Article 14), and an inherent infringement of Article 21 as well as basic human values. (c) The Act was un-Islamic, unconstitutional, and had the potential to suffocate Muslim women while also undermining the secular character that is a basic feature of the Constitution. There was thus no rhyme or reason to deprive Muslim women of the applicability of the provisions of Section 125 CrPC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Defending the validity of the enactment, it was argued on behalf of the Respondents that: (a) if the legislature, as a matter of policy, wanted to apply Section 125 CrPC to Muslims, it also meant that the same legislature could, by necessary implication, withdraw such an application of the Act and make some other provision in that regard; (b) Parliament could amend Section 125 CrPC so as to exclude its application and apply personal law instead; and (c) the policy of Section 125 CrPC was not to create a right of maintenance dehors the personal law, and it therefore could not stand in the way of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Upholding the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n
                  • A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife, which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision, extending beyond the iddat period, must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                  • The liability of a Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the iddat period.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                  • A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period can proceed, as provided under Section 4 of the Act, against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman, including her children and parents. If any of the relatives is unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                  • The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    It is unfortunate to note that the Court did not strike down the Act, which purports to exclude Muslim women in particular from the beneficial treatment of Section 125. The legislature, to appease the Muslim gentry, may have passed the Act on political considerations, but the same has rendered an indirect classification of people on the basis of religion, which is against the fundamental aspect of secularism that we have adopted in our Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    (11) Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, AIR 1987 SC 1100<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Dealing with Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the issue involved in this appeal was whether the Respondent was entitled to claim maintenance from the Appellant. The Appellant was a medical practitioner and the married daughter of the Respondent by his first wife. Her mother died in 1948. Thereafter, the Respondent remarried and was living with his second wife. He filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance from the Appellant on the ground that he was unable to maintain himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Appellant argued that under clause (d) of Section 125(1), a father was not entitled to claim maintenance from his daughter, whether married or not. She contended that the use of the word “his” in clause (d) clearly indicated that it was only the son who was burdened with the obligation to maintain his parents. It was submitted that if the legislature had intended that maintenance could be claimed from the daughter as well, it would not have used the pronoun “his.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Apex Court held that Section 125(1) CrPC conferred power on the Magistrate to order a person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of certain close relations \u2014 such as wife, children, father and mother \u2014 under certain circumstances. The Court held that while there was no doubt that it was the moral obligation of a son or a daughter to maintain his or her parents, it was not desirable that even though a son or a daughter had sufficient means, his or her parents should starve. The use of the word “his” did not exclude parents from claiming maintenance from their daughter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Court took its cue from Section 8 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1) of the General Clauses Act, wherein “he” is interpreted to include “she” as well. Therefore, the Court held that the pronoun “his” as used in clause (d) of Section 125(1) CrPC included both male and female, and thus parents were entitled to claim maintenance against their daughter under the said Section, provided that the other conditions of the Section were fulfilled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    This case clearly lays down that a daughter, even after her marriage, does not cease to be a daughter of her father or mother. It is the moral obligation of children to maintain their parents, and this has been concretised into a legal duty by Section 125(1)(d) of the CrPC, which imposes a legal duty on both son and daughter to maintain their father or mother who are unable to maintain themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    (12) Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Hon’ble Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, AIR 2005 SC 69<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Petitioner was elected as a member of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) as a candidate of the Indian National Congress. Thereafter, the notification for holding elections to the Lok Sabha was issued, and the Petitioner contested that election from another constituency as an independent candidate. One Salman Rageev, a member of the BLC, sent a petition to the Chairman of the Legislative Council stating that the Petitioner, who was a member of the Congress Party, had contested the parliamentary election as an independent candidate and had consequently, in view of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, become disqualified from being a member of the House. The Petitioner was thereupon asked to submit his explanation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    After considering the explanation tendered by him, the Chairman of the Legislative Council passed an order holding that, by contesting the election as an independent candidate while he was already a member from the Congress, the Petitioner had voluntarily given up his membership of the Congress Party. He was therefore disqualified from being a member of the House in view of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, read with Article 191(2) of the Constitution, and the seat held by him in the House had become vacant. This order was contested before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Petitioner argued that: (a) in the absence of compliance with Rules 6 and 7 of the Bihar Legislative Council Members (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1994, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Chairman in initiating the proceedings \u2014 under which the Petitioner was held to be disqualified from being a member of the House \u2014 was illegal; (b) there was a violation of the principles of natural justice, as the material relied upon by the Chairman was not disclosed to the Petitioner, nor was a proper opportunity of personal hearing afforded to him; and (c) it could not be assumed that the Petitioner had voluntarily given up membership of a political party by contesting the Lok Sabha election as an independent candidate, and therefore he had not incurred any disqualification within the meaning of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Apex Court held that the Chairman of the Legislative Council had found that the fact that the Petitioner had been elected to the Legislative Council on the ticket of the Indian National Congress, and had contested the parliamentary election as an independent candidate, was established and was in fact also accepted by the Petitioner. There could therefore be no escape from the conclusion that the Petitioner had incurred the disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Schedule, and the decision of the Chairman was accordingly correct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Giving full support towards reducing the menacing element of political clout in the Indian political arena, the Supreme Court declared in this case, in categorical terms, that prohibitive restrictions such as the anti-defection law shall be interpreted in the widest terms. The analogy accepted by the Court \u2014 of an implied change in party affiliation \u2014 shows the Court’s concern for curbing such unhealthy practices on the part of politicians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    (13) Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The issue for consideration before the Apex Court in this case was whether admissions to a medical college, or any other institution of higher learning situated in a State, could be confined to those who had their “domicile” within that State, or to those who had been resident within the State for a specified number of years; or whether any reservation in admissions could be made for them so as to give them precedence over those who did not possess a “domicile” or residential qualification within the State, irrespective of merit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Petitioners challenged the said policy of admission on the ground of domicile, pressing the equality clause as provided under Articles 14, 15 and 19, and Article 301 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the residential requirement as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under the State was unconstitutional, having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word “State” in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Respondents defended the policy on the ground that Article 16(2) had no application so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college were concerned. It was argued that what Article 16(2) provided was the invalidation of discrimination on the ground of place of birth, and since the condition in the present case related to residence, it was not hit by the said Article.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Dismissing the petition, the Apex Court held that each and every kind of discrimination was not a violation of the constitutional concept of equality, and did not necessarily undermine the unity of India. The validity of any discrimination was to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, wherein an appropriate classification may form the very core of equality and promote unity in the true sense amidst diversity. The Court thereby upheld reservation of seats on the ground of domicile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The message of the Court in this case is loud and clear. While an arbitrary and irrational discrimination between people shall not be tolerated at any cost, there can be reasonable classification in order to promote equality in the true sense of the term. Thus, reservation of seats on the ground of domicile \u2014 being meant to promote a particular class of backward or under-developed area \u2014 shall be allowed so as to promote and achieve equality in the true sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    (14) Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The issue for deliberation in the present case was whether lawyers have a right to strike and\/or to give a call for the boycott of courts. The Petitioners sought a declaration that such strikes and\/or calls for boycott were illegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Petitioners submitted that a strike as a means of collective bargaining was recognised only in industrial disputes, and that lawyers, who were officers of the Court, could not use strikes as a means to blackmail the Courts or their clients. They further argued that a call for strike by lawyers was, in effect, a call to breach the contract that lawyers have with their clients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    On the other hand, the legal fraternity submitted that lawyers retained the right to strike in rare cases, in order to communicate their concerns in the event of improper treatment being meted out to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Supreme Court declared that lawyers have no right to go on strike or to give a call for boycott \u2014 not even a token strike. The protest, if any were required, could only be made by giving press statements, giving TV interviews, carrying banners and\/or placards outside the Court premises, wearing black, white or any colour arm bands, holding peaceful protest marches outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas, or relay fasts, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Court, acknowledging the fact that even those lawyers willing to attend the Court could not do so owing to the strike or boycott, asked lawyers to boldly refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. The Court also declared that no lawyer could be visited with any adverse consequence by the Association or the Council, and that no threat or coercion of any nature \u2014 including that of expulsion \u2014 could be held out in the event of his refusal to attend the strike or boycott.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Court further observed that an Advocate is an officer of the Court and enjoys a special status in society. Advocates have obligations and duties to ensure the smooth functioning of the Court, and they also owe a duty to their clients. Strikes interfere with the administration of justice, disrupt Court proceedings, and put the interests of their clients in jeopardy. The Court thus imposed a blanket ban on strikes by lawyers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In consequence of this decision, the legal position is that lawyers cannot go on strike. This judgment has given relief to thousands of helpless people involved in litigation. This case clearly lays down that if an advocate does not appear before a court by reason of a call for strike or boycott, then on a complaint from a client against an advocate for non-appearance, the Supreme Court can take disciplinary action under Section 38 of the Advocates Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n\n\n\n

                    (15) Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 733<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In this case, a Public Interest Litigation was filed before the Supreme Court complaining of the noise created by the use of loudspeakers in religious performances, bhajan singing and the like, in busy commercial localities on weekly off-days. It was submitted that such musical interruptions had become a nuisance for residential areas and had made life miserable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Agreeing that noise pollution had reached menacing levels, prevailing even in residential areas, the Supreme Court discussed the legal issues dealing with noise pollution in India, the ineffectiveness of environmental laws in the country, the methodology adopted in other jurisdictions, and the environmental standards and rules in India. It thereupon issued directions to deal with the situation at hand. These dealt with: (a) firecrackers, (b) loudspeakers, (c) vehicular noise, and (d) creating awareness among the Indian masses. Some of them, in particular, were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \n
                    • A complete ban on bursting sound-emitting firecrackers between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • The noise level in a public place must not exceed 10 dB(A) above the ambient noise standards for the area, or 75 dB(A), whichever is lower.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • No beating of drums or tom-toms, blowing of trumpets or any instrument, or use of any sound amplifier at night (between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.), except in public emergencies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • No horn should be allowed to be used at night (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) in a residential area, except in exceptional circumstances.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Suitable chapters should be added to textbooks that teach civic sense to children and youth at the initial or early level of education. Special talks and lectures should be organised in schools to highlight the menace of noise pollution and the role of children and the younger generation in preventing it.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Special public awareness campaigns, in anticipation of festivals, events and ceremonial occasions where firecrackers are likely to be used, should be carried out.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                      The Court also declared that these guidelines were issued in exercise of the power conferred on it under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution, and consequently they were the law of the land, applicable and in force until modified by the Court or superseded by appropriate legislation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      A landmark case in Environmental Law, it has made creating noise at night (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) a punishable offence, and has also laid down stringent guidelines for reducing noise pollution in the country as a whole, with regard being paid to each noise-creating source in particular. The Court has played its part; however, much depends upon the ability of the executive to get the directions implemented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \n\n\n\n

                      (16) Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3021<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                      Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Coming as a Public Interest Litigation, the petition was filed by a public-spirited advocate, Mr. Gaurav Jain, seeking a declaration that prostitutes in India had: (a) the right to be free citizens; (b) the right not to be trapped again; and (c) the right of readjustment through economic empowerment, social justice, self-sustenance, equality of status, dignity of person in truth and reality, and social integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Earlier, in a similar case (Gaurav Jain v. Union of India<\/em>, 1990 Supp SCC 709), the Court had not accepted the plea for hostels for the children of such prostitutes, though it had agreed with the view that such children must be segregated from their mothers and from that environment. The issue addressed in the present case therefore had a two-fold aspect: first, the rights of the children of “fallen women,” especially girls; and second, in the process, the eradication of prostitution itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The Petitioner relied on various legal instruments, namely the Constitutional provisions (Articles 14, 15(3), 16(1), 21, 23, 24, 38, 39(f), 45 and 46), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (Articles 1, 4 and 6), and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (to which India is a signatory), among others. Stressing these instruments, an attempt was made to draw the attention of the judicial system towards this hard truth of society, which had persisted in different forms since ages \u2014 sometimes in the name of religion, as with the devadasi or jogin systems, and sometimes for commercial reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      After studying the variant statistical data and the factual situation in society, the Court went on to offer solutions from two standpoints:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      (a) Through the Juvenile Justice Act<\/strong>, it proposed to better the condition of these children by bringing them within the ambit of “neglected children.” Recognising the causes behind such a state of affairs \u2014 family tradition, custom, illiteracy, coercive trapping, ignorance, poverty, fear of social stigma, and also the recent trend of women from the higher strata of society entering the profession to sustain their luxury demands \u2014 the Court recommended a scheme for the children of prostitutes, and for children associating with prostitutes and prostitution: Child Development and Care Centres for the management and coordination of entrustment to NGOs, so as also to promote voluntary initiatives against this germ in society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      (b) The aspect of prostitutes themselves<\/strong> was sought to be cured, apart from action by NGOs, through the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, by expanding the horizon of the term “prostitution” by adding the word “abuse,” so as to cover any act contrary to good order. The legislation was also understood widely enough to address a “brothel” as any premises wherein a female indulges in the act of offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire. Actual intercourse or repeated visits were therefore not made pre-requisites; even a single instance, proved by surrounding circumstances, was held to be sufficient to invoke the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The judiciary took serious note of the widespread disease of prostitution, which has continued in society in a vicious cycle. A prostitute, in the course of catering to customers, gives birth to an innocent infant; to bear the costs of the child and to bring her up as a responsible citizen, she incurs heavy debts from her customers; but ultimately she leaves the burden of those unsatisfied debts on the shoulders of the child, who grows up in that environment and under a compulsion to repeat her mother’s life. The Court thus relied on the concept of the 3 Cs<\/strong> \u2014 counselling, cajoling and coercion \u2014 to enforce the legislations, as well as voluntary initiatives, to curb the menace before it engulfs the social fabric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \n\n\n\n

                      (17) Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                      Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The Appellant was a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of various medicines and life-saving drugs throughout India, including in the State of Bihar. It had a branch or sales depot at Patna, registered as a dealer, and effected sales of its manufactured products through wholesale distributors\/stockists in the districts of Bihar, who in turn sold them to retailers, through whom the medicines and drugs reached consumers. Almost 94% of the medicines and drugs sold by the company were at controlled prices, exclusive of local taxes, under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1979, issued by the Central Government under Section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act. The company was expressly prohibited from selling these medicines and drugs in excess of the controlled price fixed by the Central Government from time to time, which allowed the manufacturer or producer to pass on the tax liability to the consumer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 provided for the levy of a surcharge on every dealer whose gross turnover during a year exceeded \u20b95 lakhs, in addition to the tax payable by him, at such rate not exceeding 10 per centum of the total amount of the tax. Sub-section (3) of Section 5 prohibited such a dealer from collecting the amount of surcharge payable by him from purchasers. The Appellant challenged the constitutional validity of these sections, placing on record printed price-lists of its well-known medicines and drugs, showing the price at which it sold to retailers as also the retail price, both inclusive of excise duty. It appeared from the terms of the contract that sales tax and local taxes would be charged wherever applicable. The High Court upheld the constitutional validity, and the same was challenged in appeal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The Appellants argued:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        \n
                      • Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, providing that no dealer shall be entitled to collect the surcharge levied on him, must yield to Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, which provided that any order made under Section 3 of that Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. Applying the doctrine of occupied field and the concept of federal supremacy, it was clear that the Union legislation should prevail in a case of conflict between List II and List III.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • Sub-section (3) of Section 5, which provided that no dealer shall be entitled to collect the amount of surcharge levied on him, clearly fell within Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII and was repugnant to the scheme of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1979, insofar as price fixation of drugs was concerned, and particularly to para 21, which enabled the manufacturer of drugs to pass on the liability to pay sales tax to the consumer. In the event of such repugnance between the Control Order (made under Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, a Central enactment) and the State law, the Central law must prevail.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • The provision contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 5 was ex facie and patently discriminatory.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • The restriction imposed by Sub-section (3) of Section 5, which prevented manufacturers\/producers of medicines and drugs from passing on the liability to pay surcharge, was confiscatory and cast a disproportionate burden on such manufacturers\/producers, stipulating an unreasonable restriction on the freedom to carry on their business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • Sub-section (1) of Section 5 was ultra vires the State Legislature of Bihar, insofar as it took into account the manufacturer’s gross turnover as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act, which included transactions relating to the sale or purchase of goods that had taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, or outside the territory of India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                        The State, submitting that there was no inconsistency between Sub-section (3) of Section 5 and para 21 of the Control Order, and that both laws were capable of being obeyed, argued that the question of repugnance under Article 254(1) between a law made by Parliament and a law made by a State Legislature arose only where both legislations occupied the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, and there was a direct conflict between the two laws. It was only where both requirements were fulfilled that the State law would, to the extent of repugnance, become void. Since this was not the case, the question was to be determined not by the “doctrine of occupied field” but by the rule of “pith and substance.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        It was further submitted that the Appellants, being manufacturers or producers of drugs, were not governed by para 21 of the Control Order (which related to retail sale) but by para 24 thereof, which dealt with sale by a manufacturer\/producer to a wholesale distributor. Under para 24 of the Control Order, the manufacturer\/producer was not entitled to pass on the liability to pay sales tax, and the price charged to the wholesale distributor was inclusive of sales tax.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        It was argued that since the rationale of controlled prices of an essential commodity fixed by a Control Order by the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act was only to fix the maximum price of the commodities, and there was nothing to prevent a manufacturer or producer of medicines and drugs from selling at a price lower than the controlled price, a levy of surcharge under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Bihar Act would only cut down the profits of the manufacturer\/producer, but that would not make the State law inconsistent with the Central law. Since the surcharge was borne by the manufacturers\/producers under Sub-section (3) of Section 5, the controlled price of such medicines and drugs to the consumer remained the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The Apex Court held that the constitutional validity of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Bihar Act \u2014 which provided for the classification of dealers whose gross turnover during a year exceeded \u20b95 lakhs for the purpose of levy of surcharge in addition to the tax payable by them \u2014 was not assailable. So long as sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, sales outside the State, and sales in the course of import into or export out of the territory of India were not taxed, there was nothing to prevent the State Legislature, while making a law for the levy of surcharge under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, from taking into account the total turnover of the dealer within the State and providing, as had been done by Sub-section (1) of Section 5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The Court also observed that since the liability to pay a surcharge was not on the gross turnover including transactions covered by Article 286, but only on sales within the State, and the surcharge was sought to be levied on dealers who had a position of economic superiority, the provision was valid. Since the definition of “gross turnover” in the Bihar Act was adopted not for the purpose of bringing to surcharge inter-State sales, outside sales, or sales in the course of import into or export out of the territory of India, but only for the purpose of classifying dealers within the State and identifying the class of dealers liable to pay such surcharge, it was not ultra vires \u2014 the underlying object being to classify dealers into those who were economically superior and those who were not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Declaring that the sufficiency of territorial nexus involved a consideration of two elements \u2014 (a) the connection must be real and not illusory, and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that territorial connection \u2014 the Court held that there was sufficient territorial nexus between the persons sought to be charged and the State seeking to tax them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The Apex Court declared that the doctrine of pith and substance, employed to ascertain legislative competence, was applicable only to legislations under List III of Schedule VII. Therefore, the decision whether a law was repugnant to a State law was to be determined only by ascertaining the character of the legislation by reference to the Doctrine of Pith and Substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        \n\n\n\n

                        (18) I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n


                        (Overruled by Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The question before the Supreme Court was a challenge to the constitutional validity of an Act passed by the legislature taking away fundamental rights in an estate. The precise issue was whether any part of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution could be abrogated or changed by a constitutional amendment, even if passed by the requisite two-thirds majority of Parliament as provided in Article 368.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Earlier, in Sankari Prasad Singh v. Union of India<\/em>, AIR 1951 SC 458, a Constitution Bench of five Judges had unanimously held that Parliament had unfettered power to amend the Constitution. In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan<\/em>, AIR 1965 SC 845, the Court had upheld the power of Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution, including provisions affecting the fundamental rights of citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The law in question in the instant case was aimed at reforming land ownership and tenancy structures, implementing the socialistic goals of the Constitution (Article 39(b) and (c) of the Directive Principles of State Policy), which required equitable distribution of the resources of production among all citizens and the prevention of concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. This was opposed to the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property (Article 19(1)(f)) and Article 31, under which one could not be deprived of one’s property unless it was acquired by the State and for public purposes only, upon payment of compensation determined by law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        There were multifarious arguments from both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The Petitioners contended:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                          \n
                        • The Constitution was intended to be permanent, and therefore could not be amended in a way so as to injure, maim or destroy its indestructible character.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • The word “amendment” implied an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument, such as would effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed; it could not be so construed as to enable Parliament to destroy the permanent character of the Constitution.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • The fundamental rights were a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and therefore the power of amendment could be exercised only to preserve, rather than destroy, the essence of those rights.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • The limitations on the power to amend were implicit in Article 368 itself, as the use of words such as “repeal” and “re-enact” in other Articles meant that the expression “amend” had a limited meaning. This indicated that Article 368 only enabled a modification of the Articles within the framework of the Constitution, and not their destruction.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • The Constituent Assembly Debates \u2014 particularly the speech of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and the reply of Dr. Ambedkar, who piloted the Bill \u2014 disclosed clearly that it was never the intention of the Constitution’s framers to enable Parliament to repeal the fundamental rights by use of the power under Article 368. The circumstances under which the amendment moved by Mr. H.V. Kamath was withdrawn, and Article 368 was finally adopted, clearly showed that amendment of Part III was outside the scope of Article 368.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • Part III of the Constitution was a self-contained Code, and its provisions were elastic enough to meet all reasonable requirements of changing situations. Therefore, no amendment was warranted for them.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • Article 368 only lays down the procedure to amend, but the power to amend is only the legislative power conferred on Parliament under Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • The definition of “law” in Article 13(2) of the Constitution includes every branch of law, statutory or constitutional; therefore, the power to amend, in whichever branch it may be classified, if it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights, would be void thereunder.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                          In defence, the arguments for the State were:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            \n
                          1. A constitutional amendment is made in exercise of the sovereign power, and not the legislative power, of Parliament. It therefore partakes of the quality and character of the Constitution itself, becoming an integral part of it.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          2. The provisions of Article 368 are clear and unequivocal, with no scope for invoking implied limitations on that power. This limitation, under the doctrine of implied power, had also been expressly rejected by the American courts.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          3. The object of the amending clause in a flexible Constitution was to enable Parliament to amend the Constitution in order to express the will of the people according to the changing course of events; if the amending power were restricted by implied limitations, the Constitution itself might be destroyed by revolution. The amending procedure was therefore a safety valve, and an alternative to violent change by revolution.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          4. There were no basic and non-basic features of the Constitution; everything in the Constitution was basic, and could be amended in pursuance of the future growth and progress of the country.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          5. Debates in the Constituent Assembly could not be relied upon for construing Article 368, and even if they could be, there was nothing in the debates to prove positively that fundamental rights were excluded from the purview of amendment.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          6. Since amendments were made out of political necessity, they involved questions such as how to exercise power, how to make the lot of citizens better, and the like; therefore, not being judicial questions, they were outside the Court’s jurisdiction.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          7. The language of Article 368 was clear, categorical and imperative, while the language of Article 13(2) admitted qualifications or limitations; therefore, the Court must construe the latter in a manner that it could not control Article 368.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                          8. In order to enforce the Directive Principles, the Constitution had been amended from time to time, and the great fabric of the Indian Union had been built since 1950 on the basis that the Constitution could be amended. Therefore, any reversal of the previous decisions would introduce economic chaos in the country, and the burden on the Petitioners was very heavy to establish that the fundamental rights could not be amended under Article 368.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            Presided over by Chief Justice Subba Rao, this eleven-Judge Bench, by a 6:5 majority, held that the fundamental rights were not amenable to the amending power under Article 368. The Court held that Article 368, which contained provisions relating to the amendment of the Constitution, merely laid down the amending procedure. It did not confer upon Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. The amending power (or constituent power) of Parliament arose from other provisions contained in the Constitution (i.e., Articles 245, 246 and 248), which gave it the power to make laws (i.e., plenary legislative power) only. The Apex Court thus held that the amending power and the legislative powers of Parliament were essentially the same. Therefore, any amendment of the Constitution was deemed to be “law” as understood in Article 13(2), and consequently was to be struck down if it violated the fundamental rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            The judgment invoked the concept of implied limitations on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. The Court held that the Constitution gives a place of permanence to the fundamental freedoms of the citizen; in giving the Constitution to themselves, the people had reserved the fundamental rights for themselves. Another aspect of the judgment is that it introduced in India the doctrine of prospective overruling<\/strong>, whereby, in order not to disturb hitherto concluded transactions under previously invalid laws, all invalidations would be operative only from the future. The Court therefore declared that henceforth all laws violative of fundamental rights would be void ab initio<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            \n\n\n\n

                            (19) In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n


                            (Overruled by Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra, the then President of the Bar Council of India, was accused of abusing a judge of the Allahabad High Court. The incident occurred while the Court was in session, and the applicant Judge was in the process of hearing a case in which the contemnor was appearing on behalf of one of the parties. According to the applicant Judge (Justice S.K. Keshote), the contemnor had started shouting in reply to a question and had threatened that he would get the Judge transferred and even impeached. The Judge further complained that the contemnor had insulted him in open Court. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court of India for decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            Before the Supreme Court, the following was argued by the Contemnor:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                              \n
                            • That the applicant Judge had treated him unfairly and had proceeded to set aside an order of the lower court without even hearing the arguments.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • That he was being “roughed up” by the Judge for taking a fearless stand to protect the freedom of the Bar.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • That an investigation must be ordered into the incident to find out whether contempt had been committed, punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution or under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • That his conduct did not amount to contempt, as normally altercations take place between a Judge and the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on either side; but there being no intention, the provisions of contempt were not attracted.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • That the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to punish for an act of contempt committed in respect of another Court of Record, which was invested with identical and independent power for punishing contempt of itself.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                              The Supreme Court, rejecting the contention of the contemnor that the Court could not take cognizance of contempt committed in respect of another Court, held that being a Court of Record, the Court had the power to punish for contempt of High Courts also.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                              The Apex Court also did not accept the subsequent unconditional apology of the contemnor, for the reasons that: (a) it was not a free and frank admission of the misdemeanour; and (b) the Court did not find any sincere regret for his act of disrespect shown to the applicant. Instead, the apology was concealed in such garbed language that it justified his conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court, exercising its power to do complete justice under Article 142 read with Article 129, found the contemnor guilty of criminal contempt of court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                              The important aspects of the judgment can be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                \n
                              • The Supreme Court held that under Articles 129, 215 and 142 of the Constitution, the Court had the power to take suo motu cognizance of contempt proceedings.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                              • It also held that Article 129 vested the Supreme Court not only with the power to punish for contempt of itself, but also of lower courts and tribunals, in its capacity as the highest court of the land.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                                \n\n\n\n

                                (20) In Re: Death of Sawinder Singh Grover, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 450<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                In the instant case, one Sawinder Singh Grover had died in the custody of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). It was contended that he had jumped to his death while in the said custody. The question before the Supreme Court was therefore whether he had actually jumped to his death, thereby committing suicide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                The inquiry report of the trial judge was considered by the Court, wherein the following facts were evident: (a) the death had occurred under suspicious circumstances; (b) the deposition of the CBI officer as to the circumstances leading to the death was found to be false; (c) the jump leading to the death was certainly not a suicidal one; and (d) there was a high chance of “torture” and “sour misfeasance” on the part of the CBI officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Upon consideration of the facts submitted by the trial judge, the Apex Court ordered the prosecution of the CBI officials responsible for the said offence, and awarded a sum of \u20b92,00,000 as ex gratia interim relief to the widow of the deceased.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Through this judgment, the Court has made it clear that it will not tolerate any abuse of power by the executive leading to the violation of rights during detention. The fact that compensation was awarded as an interim relief reveals the stand of the Court \u2014 that it will stand tall for the protection of the rights of the affected parties, even if it requires enforcement against high officials of the executive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                \n\n\n\n

                                (21) Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1446<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                In a small village, Bichhri, in Rajasthan, a cluster of chemical industries was located, some of which manufactured the highly toxic pollutant acid “H” and other similar toxic chemicals. This “H” acid gave rise to enormous quantities of highly toxic effluents, with iron-based and gypsum-based sludge in particular, which \u2014 in the absence of proper treatment \u2014 were poisoning the earth and water and destroying the ecological setup.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                A study by the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board revealed that these chemical units had already turned out about 2,400\u20132,500 M.T. of highly toxic sludge. Since this toxic, untreated waste water was allowed to flow out freely and was thrown in the open, in and around the complex, the toxic substances had percolated deep into the earth, polluting the aquifers and the subterranean supply of water. The water in the wells and streams had turned toxic, rendering it unfit for human consumption and even for irrigating the land. The soil had also become unfit for cultivation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Upon these facts, a Public Interest Litigation was filed in August 1989, seeking the removal of the industries creating havoc in the lives of the local inhabitants, and the proper cleaning of the damage caused.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Opposing the process adopted by the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board, the Respondents submitted that the officials had throughout been hostile to them, and that since no opportunity to file objections to the said Report, or to produce material to contradict its statements, had been allowed, the Report could not be acted upon. They further argued that they, not falling within the meaning of the term “State” under Article 12, were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                Considering the enormity of the situation, the Supreme Court directed as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  \n
                                • The Central Government shall determine the amount required for carrying out remedial measures, including the removal of sludge in the area affected in village Bichhri and other adjacent villages.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                • On account of their continuous and persistent violations of law, their attempts to conceal the sludge, the discharge of toxic effluents, and the non-implementation of the Court’s orders \u2014 as reflected in the expert committees’ Reports \u2014 the Respondents were characterised as “rogue industries.”<\/strong> Accordingly, the Court ordered the closure of all their plants and factories located in Bichhri village.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                • The Court allowed any organisation, on behalf of the villagers, to claim damages for the loss suffered by them in the affected area.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                • The Court directed the Central Government and the State Pollution Control Board to file quarterly reports before the Court with respect to the progress in implementing the directions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                • The Respondents were directed to pay compensation for the pollution caused by them.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  The judgment in the instant case concretised the principle of “Polluter Pays,”<\/strong> in order to discourage such activities on the part of polluting enterprises and to impose heavy costs for reversing the damage caused by them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  \n\n\n\n

                                  (22) Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  Complying with the mandate under Article 340 of the Constitution, the Central Government appointed a Backward Class Commission on 29 January 1953 to determine the backward classes in the country. The Commission \u2014 popularly known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission \u2014 submitted its report, but the Government, being not satisfied with the approach adopted by the Commission in determining the criteria for identifying the backward classes under Article 15(4), did not accept its recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  Thereupon, a second Backward Class Commission \u2014 popularly known as the Mandal Commission \u2014 was appointed to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India. The recommendations of this Commission were accepted and implemented by the Central Government. Several writ petitions were filed against this order of the Government implementing the recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  As the matter of reservation had been settled by various earlier decisions of the Court, which were sought to be affected by this order, the present Bench of nine Judges was constituted to finally settle the legal position relating to reservations, and also to decide the issues relating to the interpretation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                  The Apex Court held as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                    \n
                                  • The words “provision for the reservation” in Article 16(4) refer to a provision to be made by the executive wing of the State, and not the legislature. The executive is therefore competent to provide for any determination of backwardness.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Executive orders made by the Government in terms of Article 16(4) are enforceable forthwith, without there being any need for a law by Parliament on the subject.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Article 16(4) is not an exception to, but an explanation and facet of, Article 16(1).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the concept of reservation for the backward classes, but is not exhaustive of the concept of reservation itself under the constitutional precincts.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • The interpretation that Article 16(1) does not permit reservation is erroneous.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Neither the Constitution prescribes, nor is it possible for the Court to lay down, any procedure for the determination of “backward class.” It is better left to the authority appointed to identify them, which could adopt such method or procedure as it thought convenient; so long as it covered the entire populace, no objection could be taken to it.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were covered within the ambit of the term “backward classes,” while other socially and economically backward classes were also covered.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Economic criterion could not be the only criterion for the determination of “backward class.”<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • There could not be any further categorisation within the backward class so identified.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • The reservation provided under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50% of the total posts.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • The carry-forward rule (for unfilled vacancies) was not subject to the 50% limit.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                  • Article 16(4) does not permit a rule of reservation even in promotion.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                    This judgment has the following facets:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                      \n
                                    • The Court did not give a definite interpretation to the term “backward class,” and directed the Government to come out with a definition in this regard. Thus, the main issue still remains undecided as to for whom the protection has been granted under Article 16(4), and who all can avail of the same.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                    • This arduous exercise by the Court to give a definite standpoint to the interpretation of Article 16 went in vain, as it did not seek to resolve the conflict over reservation, and also because a majority of the propositions settled in the decision have been either overruled in later judgments or set aside by legislative amendments.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                                      \n\n\n\n

                                      (23) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                      Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                      This seven-Judge Bench was constituted to decide a controversial issue relating to the power of judicial review of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Article 226 (along with Article 227) and Article 32 of the Constitution respectively, vis-\u00e0-vis clause (1) of Article 323A and clause (2) of Article 323B, wherein power was conferred on Parliament and the State Legislatures to exclude this power of judicial review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                      Though the principal facts and issues in consideration in the matters pending before the various High Courts as regards the two clauses were diverse, the Bench was concerned with only three important issues, namely:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                        \n
                                      • The power conferred (by Articles 323A and 323B) upon Parliament and the State Legislatures to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, including the power of judicial review of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under the Constitution.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                      • The competence of the Tribunals created under those Articles to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision or rule.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                      • Whether those Tribunals could be said to be effective substitutes for the High Courts in discharging the power of judicial review.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                        Inter alia<\/em>, the Court also had to reconsider its earlier decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India<\/em>, (1987) 1 SCC 124, wherein it was held that though judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, the vesting of the power of judicial review in an alternative institutional mechanism \u2014 after taking it away from the High Courts \u2014 would not do violence to the basic structure, so long as it was ensured that the alternative mechanism was an effective and real substitute for the High Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                        The Petitioners argued as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                          \n
                                        • Clause (1) of Article 323A and clause (2) of Article 323B were unconstitutional, as Parliament could not exclude the constitutional jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts. These provisions violated the basic structure of the Constitution, as they took away the power of judicial review vested in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                        • Though the decision in Sampath Kumar<\/em> was founded on the hope that the Tribunals would be effective substitutes for the High Courts, that position was neither factually nor legally correct, and thus the position needed to be changed.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                        • The impugned constitutional provisions violated the basic structure, as they sought to divest the High Courts of their power of superintendence over all Tribunals and Courts within their territorial jurisdiction.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                          In its defence, the Union submitted:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                            \n
                                          • Tribunals were not substitutes, but supplemental to the High Courts, in the wake of the problem of an enormous increase in the volume of fresh institution of suits, coupled with massive arrears.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                          • The decision in Sampath Kumar<\/em> should be upheld, as the Court there had actually monitored and directed the amendments to the Administrative Tribunals Act, and was satisfied that there was no need to strike it down.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                          • The essence of the power of judicial review was only that judicial power must always remain with the judiciary, and must not be surrendered to the executive or the legislature; since the impugned provisions saved the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, thereby allowing the judiciary to have the final say in every form of adjudication, judicial review could not be said to have been violated.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                            The Apex Court decided as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                              \n
                                            • The impugned clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B were unconstitutional to the extent that they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                            • The power of judicial review over legislative action, vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32, was a part of the basic structure, and therefore could never be excluded.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                            • The Tribunals created under Articles 323A and 323B possessed the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                            • The adjudicatory decisions of the Tribunals were subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts, wherein a new procedure was to be followed. The Apex Court prescribed that no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal was to lie directly before the Supreme Court under Article 136; instead, the aggrieved party was entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226 or 227, and only from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court could the aggrieved party move the Supreme Court under Article 136.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                              The decision is consequential on account of the following important implications:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                \n
                                              • The Court warned that the constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary were not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary, or to the members of Tribunals created by ordinary legislation. Consequently, Judges of the latter category could never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                              • The Court observed that so long as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32, was retained, there was no reason why the power to test the validity of legislations against the provisions of the Constitution could not be conferred upon the Tribunals. Thus, a case for the existence of the Tribunals, and for endowing them with judicial powers, was made out by the Court.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                              • The Court opined that Tribunals were established with the objectives of speedy justice, uniformity of approach, predictability of decisions, and specialist justice; thus, the framework of the Tribunal was to retain its basic judicial character and inspire public confidence, but it could not, in this process, supplant the High Courts or judicial review itself. The limits of the Tribunals as regards their judicial powers were thus drawn.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                              • It was held that though the Tribunals were competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions were in question, in discharging this duty they could not act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, which were specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this regard was only supplementary, and all such decisions of the Tribunals were subject to the scrutiny of the High Courts.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                              • The Court entrusted the Tribunals with the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules, but drew an exception: Tribunals could not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes, for the reason that a Tribunal, which was itself a creature of an Act, could not declare that very Act to be unconstitutional.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                              • Direct approach to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, in matters dealt with by the Tribunals, was barred; they could be approached only in appellate jurisdiction, except where the parent statute itself was in question, or for a related matter.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                                                \n\n\n\n

                                                (24) Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 469<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                This writ petition was initiated on the basis of a letter addressed by the Petitioner, complaining of malpractices indulged in by social organisations and voluntary agencies engaged in the work of offering Indian children in adoption to foreign parents \u2014 who, according to the Petitioner, were being used for illegal purposes such as child sexual abuse, cheap labour and other similar work. The Petitioner accordingly sought relief restraining Indian-based private agencies from carrying out any further activity of routing children for adoption abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                The Court expressed its concern that children needed special protection owing to their tender age and physique, mental immaturity, and incapacity to look after themselves. It also observed that they must be brought up in an atmosphere of love and affection, and under the tender care and attention of parents, so that they may be able to attain full emotional, intellectual and spiritual stability and maturity, and acquire self-confidence, self-respect and a balanced view of life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                Commenting upon the practice of adoption, the Court held that it was the well-being of the child which was of the utmost importance, and if the foreigner who wanted to take the child in adoption was found to be genuinely interested, the child may be given in adoption to him. However, the Court also warned that while supporting the practice of inter-country adoption, it was necessary to ascertain that the primary object of giving the child in adoption was the welfare of the child. Great care was to be exercised in permitting the child to be given in adoption to foreign parents, lest the child be neglected or abandoned by the adoptive parents in the foreign country; or the adoptive parents be unable to provide the child a life of moral or material security; or the child be subjected to moral or sexual abuse, forced labour or experimentation for medical or other research, and be placed in a worse situation than in his own country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                The Court thereupon laid down the procedure for giving a child in adoption to foreign parents, summarised as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  \n
                                                • Every application from a foreigner desiring to adopt a child must be sponsored by a social or child welfare agency recognised or licensed by the Government of the country in which the foreigner is resident.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                • Before a decision is taken by the biological parents to surrender the child for adoption, they should be helped to understand all the implications of adoption, including the possibility of adoption by a foreigner; and they should be told specifically that in case the child is adopted, it would not be possible for them to have any further contact with the child.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                • It should not be open to any and every agency or individual to process an application from a foreigner for taking a child in adoption; such an application should be processed only through a social or child welfare agency licensed or recognised by the Government of India, or the Government of the State in which it is operating.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                • The entire procedure \u2014 including preparation of the child study report, making of necessary enquiries, and taking of requisite steps leading up to the filing of an application for guardianship of the child proposed to be given in adoption \u2014 must be completed expeditiously, so that the child does not have to remain in the care and custody of a social or child welfare agency, without the warmth and affection of family life, longer than is absolutely necessary.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                • If a child is to be given in inter-country adoption, it would be desirable that it be given in such adoption, as far as possible, before it completes the age of three years. The reason is that if a child is adopted before it attains the age of understanding, it is always easier for it to get assimilated and integrated into the new environment in which it may find itself on being adopted by a foreign parent.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  This judgment reflects the concern for the special protection of children. This case is also notable for the fact that it marked the trend of the Court framing guidelines and providing procedure \u2014 a task earmarked for the executive \u2014 in the absence of any statutory rules being provided for the same by the executive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  \n\n\n\n

                                                  (25) M\/s Modi Cements Limited v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, AIR 1998 SC 1057<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The case arose out of a complaint filed by the Appellant company under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Respondent had to settle a monetary liability resulting from a transaction of cement purchase from the Appellant company. In partial discharge of the said liability, the Respondent drew three cheques in favour of the Appellant company, which were returned by the bank with the endorsement “payment stopped by the drawer.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The precise issue for consideration before the Apex Court was therefore: Whether the return of a cheque by the bank because of a stop-payment instruction amounted to dishonour of the cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  It was argued that since the fact that the cheque was dishonoured because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour the cheque, or that it exceeded the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, was not made out, an offence under Section 138 of the Act was not established.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Supreme Court observed that if it were held that \u2014 where a cheque was issued to the payee or holder in due course, and before it was presented for encashment a notice was issued to him not to present the same for encashment, and yet the payee or holder in due course presented the cheque to the bank for payment, and it was returned on such instruction \u2014 Section 138 was not attracted, then the very object of introducing Section 138 would be defeated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  It was thus contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act to give instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, as it would allow the drawer to easily get rid of the penal consequences, notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence had been committed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The judgment is of seminal importance to the commercial world, as the Court held that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was not based upon the presumption of dishonesty against the drawer of the cheque, and that the cheque would be considered dishonoured under the said Section if the bank refused to honour the cheque on the instruction of stop-payment, given immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  \n\n\n\n

                                                  (26) M\/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  This Writ Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court, challenging the permission granted to certain builders to escalate the rates in respect of construction permitted on exempted land under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. The State of Maharashtra was considering the formulation of certain guidelines in respect of constructions over exempted lands covered under Section 20 of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Under the scheme of the Act, urban agglomerations were divided into four classes, and a ceiling was prescribed for each classification. Vacant land in excess of the ceiling under the provisions of Section 10 of the Act vested in the State by way of acquisition, and the vacant sites thus acquired by the State were intended to be utilised for purposes of housing; Sections 23 and 24 of the Act provided for the disposal of vacant land. The Act therefore purported to take away the excess land from its holders, and to utilise the same for purposes of housing and other public purposes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Considering the gravity of the situation at hand and the alleged mala fides, the Court directed that the genuineness of the claims be scrutinised by an efficient judicial officer, not below the rank of an Additional District Judge, in respect of the schemes undertaken in every agglomeration \u2014 and even those which the State Government may undertake in future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Court observed that in the event of the claims being found tenable, the builders would be directed to provide accommodation in terms of the scheme for those found to be acceptable. Further, in order to ensure implementation of the said direction, the builders were called upon not to make any commitment or allotments for flats until the claims of the 1,420 applicants were scrutinised, and allotment of accommodation for such number of persons as were found entitled had been provided.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Court in this case laid down measures to impress upon every committee that the fulfilment of the laudable purpose of providing a home to the poor and homeless depends upon its commitment to the goal, and that every effort should be made by it to ensure that the builder does not succeed in frustrating that purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  \n\n\n\n

                                                  (27) Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D’Costa, AIR 1987 SC 1281<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Respondent before the Supreme Court was an erstwhile employee of the Appellant company, who during the period of her employment was working as a “confidential lady stenographer.” She complained that during the period of her employment after the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 came into force, she was being paid remuneration at rates less favourable than those at which remuneration was being paid by the company to stenographers of the male sex in its establishment, for performing the same or similar work. She therefore made a claim for recovery of an amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration she was being paid and the remuneration paid to the male stenographers who had put in the same length of service during the period of the operation of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The company opposed the petition on the grounds that the lady stenographers who had been doing duty as confidential stenographers attached to the senior executives of the company were not doing the same work which the male stenographers were discharging, and that there was no discrimination on account of sex. It was also contended that the difference in salary was due to the settlement that had been reached between the union and the company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Supreme Court, considering the impact of the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization), of which India was one of the parties, and also the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, observed that whether a particular work was the same or similar in nature to another work could be classified on three considerations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  (a) The authority should take a broad view;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  (b) In ascertaining whether any differences were of practical importance, the authority should take an equally broad approach, for the very concept of similar work implies differences in detail \u2014 these small differences should not defeat a claim of equality on trivial grounds;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  (c) One should look at the duties actually performed, and not at those theoretically possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Upon these considerations, the Court held that the Confidential Lady Stenographers were doing the same work, or work of a similar nature as defined by Section 2(h) of the Act, as the male stenographers were performing, and therefore her claim was entitled to succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Supreme Court, coming down harshly upon the employer, declared in categorical terms that it shall not accept any discrimination between males and females as regards payment of wages, where they were performing the same tasks. The Court declared that in view of the mandate under Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, the liability to pay irrespective of sex was mandatory on the employer. If an employer violated it, he could be prosecuted for the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  \n\n\n\n

                                                  (28) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Petitioner was the holder of a passport issued to her under the Passports Act, 1967. She later received a letter from the Regional Passport Officer, Delhi, intimating that the Government of India had decided to impound her passport under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act in the public interest, and requiring her to surrender the passport. In reply, the Petitioner requested the Officer to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the said order. The Ministry of External Affairs responded that the Government had decided “in the interest of the general public” not to furnish her a copy of the statement of reasons. The Petitioner thereupon filed the present petition, challenging the Government’s action in impounding her passport and declining to give reasons for doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                  The Government’s action was impugned on several grounds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    \n
                                                  • The order passed against her was actuated by mala fides.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                  • Section 10(3)(c), insofar as it empowered the Passport Authority to impound a passport “in the interests of the general public,” was violative of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, as the condition “in the interests of the general public” limiting the exercise of the power was vague and undefined, and was therefore excessive and suffered from the vice of “over-breadth.”<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                  • An order under Section 10(3)(c) impounding a passport could not be made without giving an opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence; since this was not done in the instant case, the order was null and void. Further, if Section 10(3)(c) were read in such a manner as to exclude the right of hearing, the Section would be infected with the vice of arbitrariness and would be void as offending Article 14.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                  • The impounding of the passport was violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) and (g), insofar as the right to go abroad is read into the freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom of occupation or business, respectively.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The conjoined reading of fundamental rights was upheld in the present case, as had been declined in Gopalan’s case<\/em>, AIR 1950 SC 27. It was held that each Fundamental Right did not form a separate code, and thus a mere sufficing of an express right did not relax the test on other rights supplementing the case. Hence, mere satisfaction of procedure was not sufficient; rather, the principle of reasonableness \u2014 which, legally as well as philosophically, was an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness \u2014 pervaded Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14, and this led to the significance of the enshrinement of natural justice in such procedure. The Court went further to lay down the law that, as regards the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there could be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for that purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Court held that as the law under Section 10(3) allowed the Central Government: (a) to take such action having no right of appeal; and (b) to curtail the right to seek reasons, under the law which provided for the passport authority to do so if it was of the opinion that it would not be in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country, or in the interests of the general public to furnish such a copy \u2014 hence, having followed the procedure established by law without any deviance, the implementation by the administrative body could not be challenged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    As regards the allegation of mala fides, it was held that as she was to be inquired before Commissions of Inquiry, and the Ministry had acted on confidential information of her leaving the country, such an order had to be moved. Discussing the concept further, the law enunciated was that merely because a statutory provision empowering an authority to take action in specified circumstances is constitutionally valid, as not being in conflict with any fundamental rights, it does not give a carte blanche to the authority to make any order it likes, so long as it is within the parameters laid down by the statutory provision. Every order made under the statutory provision must not only be within the authority conferred by the statutory provision, but must also stand the test of fundamental rights. Parliament cannot be presumed to have intended to confer power on an authority to act in contravention of fundamental rights. It is a basic constitutional assumption underlying every statutory grant of power that the authority on which the power is conferred should act constitutionally, and not in violation of any fundamental rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Court held that the right to go abroad was not covered by the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and (g). The Court observed that the test to be applied in such cases was the “doctrine of direct and inevitable effect.”<\/strong> Thus, what was necessarily to be seen was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    \n

                                                    “Whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of a named fundamental right, or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right, so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                    This being not established in the instant case, the Court held that the right to go abroad could not in all circumstances be regarded as included in the freedom of speech and expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    This judgment re-establishes that arbitrariness is the antithesis of the fundamental right of equality (under Article 14). It also establishes that the procedure spoken of in Article 21 ought to be “right and just and fair,” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all, and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    \n\n\n\n

                                                    (29) Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Petitioner was a company owning a textile undertaking, which was subsequently nationalised and taken over by the Central Government under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974. The Petitioners contended that Section 4 and Section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 to the Constitution of India were constitutionally invalid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Section 4 substituted the words in Article 31C with “all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV,” which earlier was restricted to only Article 39. This thereby took away judicial review of any law on any alleged violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 19, if it supposedly seemed to further the principles of the Directive Principles of State Policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Section 55 inserted clauses (4) and (5) in Article 368, which swept away judicial review from any amendment made to the Constitution by the legislature, including Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Relying on the decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala<\/em>, AIR 1973 SC 1461 \u2014 that “the Constitution is a heritage, hence do not destroy its identity” \u2014 it was contended by the Petitioners that since the Constitution itself provided limited powers of amendment, Parliament could not, in the exercise of that limited power, enlarge that limited power into absolute power; hence Section 55 was unconstitutional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    As regards Section 4, it was argued that though the Directive Principles were mandatory as the ends of government, they could be achieved only by permissible means \u2014 that is, by reading them in harmony with Fundamental Rights. Section 4, which made the Fundamental Rights subordinate to the Directive Principles, was not agreeable to the structure of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Defending the impugned Sections, the Attorney General argued that when a law was enacted to further social and economic justice as advocated under the Directive Principles, it could never cause any injustice or violate any fundamental right. Moreover, Section 4 did not snatch away judicial review totally; rather, questions such as the reasonable and actual nexus of the law with the essence of the Directive Principles supposedly furthered would still be exposed to judicial scrutiny, and hence the provision was not unconstitutional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Accepting the challenges made, the Court declared both Section 4 and Section 55 as unconstitutional. The Court observed that by virtue of Section 55, Parliament was doing something, in the garb of an authority, which was not permissible by the mandate of the Constitution. Section 4 attempted to legitimise all future laws infringing fundamental rights, yet the judiciary would be paralysed to the extent of only drawing out and stretching the law to meet the nexus with the principles of the Directive Principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Owing to this decision, while the text of the Constitution of India bears the words “principles of Part IV” in Article 31C, the same has been declared invalid by this case. The case therefore shows the extent to which the judiciary would go in order to preserve the inherent character (basic feature) of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Further, in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam<\/em>, AIR 1990 SC 123, the Court read the “doctrine of reasonable nexus” to enunciate that it was not that every statute enacted with the dominant object of giving effect to the Directive Principles is entitled to protection, but only those statutes which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the Directive Principles are protected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    \n\n\n\n

                                                    (30) Mr. X v. Hospital Z, AIR 1999 SC 495<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Appellant was a doctor in the Nagaland State Medical Services who accompanied his uncle \u2014 a patient of Aortic Aneurism \u2014 to Chennai, where he was required to donate blood for the surgery. Before the donation, his blood samples were sent for testing, and he was found to be HIV+. This information was communicated to his uncle, the patient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Appellant was engaged to be married on 12 December 1995. One month before the scheduled date of marriage, the Appellant’s uncle let his brother-in-law know that the Appellant was HIV+, on which ground the marriage was called off. He also mentioned that the information as to the Appellant’s HIV+ status had been furnished to him by the Doctor (Respondent 2) of Hospital Z (Respondent 1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Consequently, the brother-in-law called off the marriage the next day. The Appellant tried to contact the Respondents about the unauthorised disclosure by the Hospital as to his health status, but received no satisfactory reply from the Management. Thereupon, he went before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, seeking compensation and interim relief for the breach of the duty to maintain confidentiality, and the consequent discrimination, loss of earnings and social ostracism. The Appellant alleged that as a result of the calling off of his marriage, the whole community had come to know about his HIV+ status, as a result of which he was facing social ostracism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                    The Appellant contended that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      \n
                                                    • The principle of medical ethics of the “Duty to take care” also included the “Duty to maintain confidentiality,” and the Respondents, having breached the same by informing the Appellant’s uncle of their own accord, had breached that duty.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                    • The duty to maintain secrecy vested in medical professionals carried a correlative right vested in the patient \u2014 that whatever came to the knowledge of the Doctor would not be divulged.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                    • The duty to maintain confidentiality as to the health of the patient was also enforceable, being provided for in the Code of Medical Ethics, formulated to regulate the conduct of medical practitioners by the Indian Medical Council.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                    • The disclosure of the fact that the Appellant was HIV+ was a violation of his Right to Privacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                      Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      The Appeal was dismissed on the ground that the fact that the Appellant was found HIV+ and the subsequent disclosure was not violative of the Right to Privacy or the Rule of Confidentiality, as the prospective bride of the Appellant was saved in time by the disclosure; otherwise, she would also have been infected by the deadly disease, had the marriage not been called off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      In coming to this conclusion, the Court held:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (a) The argument of a Duty to maintain Confidentiality was not acceptable, as the proposed marriage carried with it a health risk to an identifiable person who could be protected from being infected by the said disease, which is communicable and incurable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (b) The Hippocratic Oath, from which the Duty to maintain Secrecy terminates, was not enforceable in a court of law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (c) In certain circumstances \u2014 such as the investigation or prosecution of a serious crime, or where there was an immediate or future risk of health hazard to others \u2014 the Duty to maintain Secrecy was overridden by Public Interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (d) The right to privacy was subject to compelling public interest (as held in Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/em>, AIR 1975 SC 1295).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (e) The fact that the Doctor is morally and ethically bound to maintain secrecy as to the information imparted by the patient is subject to the rights of another person to be informed, which may clash with those of the patient’s right to be informed. Thus, the more important one takes precedence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (f) The lady to whom the Appellant was getting married had the Fundamental Right of “Right to Life” under Article 21 of the Constitution, which included the “Right to Healthy Life.” Therefore, the Right to Life of another individual took precedence over the Right to Privacy and Confidentiality of the patient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (g) The presence of venereal disorders was a valid ground for divorce. Thus, if the disease the Appellant was suffering from constituted a valid ground for divorce, then \u2014 being concealed from her that the man she was marrying was suffering from a virulent venereal disease \u2014 the marriage needed to be injuncted from being entered into, to prevent the man from spoiling the health and consequently the life of an innocent human being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (h) The Right to Marry also vested in the very same person the Duty to duly inform the future partner about a virulent ailment. The “Right to Marry” could not be enforced in a Court of law unless the person was cured of the disease, and till then it remained a “Suspended Right.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      (i) The spread of a virulent disease dangerous to life was a penal offence under Sections 269 and 270 of the Indian Penal Code. Had the Respondents kept silent about the ailment of the Appellant, then they would have actually aided the penal offence, thereby becoming particeps criminis<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      An important judgment on the rights of AIDS patients, the judgment shows the clash of interests between the rights of such patients and the rights of the world at large to be informed of the same, in order to take adequate precautions from getting affected by it. No doubt the judgment exposes AIDS patients to the world at large and leaves out the scope of a dignified life away from social ostracism, but it seems to be justified on the ground that such a right cannot be allowed to get another person affected by the same. The Court therefore justified the act of the Hospital in informing the prospective bride of the fact of the Appellant being HIV+.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      \n\n\n\n

                                                      (31) Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                      Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      This case questioned the constitutional dimensions of the failure to answer during police interrogation. The case expounded the precincts of Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Appellant was a former Chief Minister of Orissa, who was directed to appear at the Vigilance Police Station, Cuttack, for being examined in connection with a case registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Certain questions were asked of her, which she refused to answer, terming them self-incriminatory. Upon her refusal, she was charged with offences under the Indian Penal Code for refusing to assist a public officer in the performance of his duty. This act of the police was challenged by the Appellant, calling for the enforcement of her “right of silence.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                      The following issues therefore arose for consideration before the Supreme Court:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        \n
                                                      1. Whether a person likely to be accused of crimes \u2014 that is, a suspect \u2014 is entitled to the right to keep silent, as available to the accused of an offence?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      2. Whether the bar against self-incrimination operates merely with reference to a particular accusation in regard to which the police investigator interrogates, or does it extend also to other pending or potential accusations outside the specific investigation which has led to the questioning?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      3. Does the constitutional shield of silence swing into action only in court, or can it barricade the “accused” against incriminating interrogation at the stages of police investigation also?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      4. What is the ambit of the cryptic expression “compelled to be a witness against himself” occurring in Article 20(3) of the Constitution? Does “compulsion” involve physical or like pressure or duress of an unlawful texture, or does it also cover crypto-compulsion or psychic coercion, given a tense situation or an officer in authority interrogating an accused person, armed with power to insist on an answer?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      5. Does being “a witness against oneself” include a testimonial tendency to incriminate, or the probative probability of guilt flowing from the answer?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      6. What are the parameters of Section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code? Does a tendency to expose a person to a criminal charge embrace answers which have an inculpatory impact in other criminal cases actually or about to be investigated or tried?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      7. Does “any person” in Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code include an accused person, or only a witness?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      8. When does an answer self-incriminate, or tend to expose one to a charge? What distinguishing features mark off nocent and innocent, permissible and impermissible interrogations and answers? Is the setting relevant, or should the answer, in vacuo<\/em>, bear a guilty badge on its bosom?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      9. Does mens rea<\/em> form a necessary component of Section 179 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and if so, what is its precise nature? Can a mere apprehension that any answer has a guilty potential salvage the accused, or bring into play the exclusionary rule?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                      10. Where do we demarcate the boundaries of the benefit of doubt in the setting of Section 161(2) CrPC and Section 179 IPC?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        It was argued before the Supreme Court that if it were permissible in law to obtain evidence from an accused person by compulsion, what was the need to tread the hard path of laborious investigation and prolonged examination of other men, materials and documents? It was well said that an abolition of this privilege would be an incentive for those in charge of the enforcement of law “to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil’s eyes rather than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.” It was therefore requested that the Court strike a balance between the needs of law enforcement, on the one hand, and the protection of the citizen from oppression and injustice at the hands of the law-enforcement machinery, on the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        The Court held that “any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case” included an accused person who filled that role, because the police supposed him to have committed the crime and must, therefore, be familiar with the facts. The supposition might later prove a fiction, but that did not repel the Section. The Court therefore declared that suspects \u2014 though not yet formally charged, but embryonically accused on record \u2014 could also swim into the harbour of Article 20(3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        The Court observed that a constitutional provision receives its full semantic range, and so it followed that a wider connotation was to be imparted to the expressions “accused of any offence” and “to be a witness against himself.” In Article 20(3), the expression “accused of any offence” must therefore mean formally accused in praesenti<\/em> and not in futuro<\/em>. The expression “to be a witness against himself” meant more than the court process. Any giving of evidence, any furnishing of information, if likely to have an incriminating impact, answered the description of being a witness against oneself. Not being limited to the forensic stage by express words in Article 20(3), the Court construed the expression to apply to every stage where furnishing of information and collection of materials took place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                        The Court also observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                          \n
                                                        • “Compelled testimony” was evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence, but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods, and the like \u2014 not legal penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal to answer, or to answer truthfully, could not be regarded as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                        • “The prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of pressure \u2014 subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect \u2014 but sufficiently substantial, applied by the policeman for obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes ‘compelled testimony,’ violative of Article 20(3). Frequent threats of prosecution if there is failure to answer may take on the complexion of undue pressure violating Article 20(3). Legal penalty may by itself not amount to duress, but the manner of mentioning it to the victim of interrogation may introduce an element of tension and a tone of command perilously hovering near compulsion.”<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                        • The accused is entitled to keep his mouth shut if the answer sought has a reasonable prospect of exposing him to guilt in some other accusation, actual or imminent, even though the investigation under way is not with reference to that.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                        • The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not be denied to any person who is arrested. This does not mean that a person who is not under arrest or custody can be denied that right. The spirit and sense of Article 22(1) is that it is fundamental to the rule of law that the services of a lawyer shall be available for consultation to any accused person under circumstances of near-custodial interrogation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                        • In determining the incriminatory character of an answer, the accused is entitled to consider \u2014 and the Court, while adjudging, will take note of \u2014 the setting, the totality of circumstances, and the equation, personal and social, which have a bearing on making an answer substantially innocent but in effect guilty in import. However, fanciful claims, unreasonable apprehensions and vague possibilities cannot be the hiding ground for an accused person. He is bound to answer where there is no clear tendency to criminate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                          For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                          The judgment is significant for all citizens on account of the following propositions it lays down:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            \n
                                                          1. The protection of Article 20(3) is available even at the police interrogation stage. In simple words, even a suspect accused has a right to remain silent while being interrogated by the police for gathering information about the offence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                          2. The accused not only has a right to remain silent against interrogations pertaining to the offence in question, but also against questions which might have an incriminatory effect as regards any other offence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                          3. Elements of compulsive interrogation include not only physical threats or violence, but also psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                          4. The manner of mentioning legal consequences to the victim of interrogation, in case of failure to answer, may introduce an element of tension and a tone of command perilously hovering near compulsion.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                          5. The accused has the right to consult his lawyer even at the police interrogation stage.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                            (32) Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia, [2002] 38 SCL 625 (SC)<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The present case dealt with the issue concerning the composition of an arbitral tribunal. The Appellant contended that Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was a mandatory provision which could not be derogated from. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 provided that the parties were free to determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such number should not be an even number. Sub-section (2) provided that in case the parties failed to determine the number of arbitrators, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            It was pointed out that even though the parties were free to determine the number of arbitrators, such number could not be an even number. It was also submitted that any agreement which permitted the parties to appoint an even number of arbitrators would be contrary to the mandatory provision of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            It was argued that such an agreement would be invalid and void, as the Arbitral Tribunal would not have been validly constituted. The Appellant therefore submitted that in such circumstances \u2014 the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal itself being invalid \u2014 the proceedings and any award, even if one were passed, would be invalid and unenforceable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the Respondents that Sections 4, 10 and 16, being part of the integrated scheme provided in the said Act, had to be read in a manner whereby there was no conflict between any of them, or by which any provision was not rendered nugatory. It was pointed out that Section 10 began with the words, “The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators.” It was therefore submitted that arbitration was a matter of agreement between the parties, and as such, the parties were free to determine the number of arbitrators and the procedure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            It was further argued on behalf of the Respondents that: (a) the parties were free to agree upon an even number of arbitrators; (b) even after a party had agreed to an even number of arbitrators, it could still have objected to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal; (c) such an objection could be taken even though the parties had appointed, or participated in the appointment of, the arbitrator under Section 16(2); and (d) the wording of Section 16 was wide enough to cover even an objection to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            It was submitted that an award could be challenged on the ground of the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal only provided that an objection was first taken before the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16, and the Arbitral Tribunal had rejected such an objection. In other words, it was necessary that such a challenge be made as soon as possible before the Arbitral Tribunal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            In fact, it was also contended on behalf of the Respondents that Section 34(2)(a)(v) did not permit the setting aside of an award on the ground of the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal if the composition was in accordance with the agreement of the parties. In the case under consideration, it was claimed that the composition was in accordance with the agreement of the parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Apex Court observed that a conjoint reading of Sections 10 and 16 of the Act showed that an objection to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was a matter which was derogable, because a party was free not to object within the time prescribed in Section 16(2). The Court held that Section 10 had to be read along with Section 16, and was therefore a derogable provision. The Court also observed that such a challenge could be taken even though the party may have participated in the appointment of the arbitrator, and\/or may have himself appointed the arbitrator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Supreme Court also refused to accept the Appellant’s argument that, as a matter of public policy, Section 10 should be held to be non-derogable. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, arbitration being a creature of agreement between the parties, it would be impossible for the Legislature to cover all aspects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Going against the spirit of the text of the enactment, the law which stands today is that parties are free to appoint an even number of arbitrators, and if any objection on that score has to be taken, it should be done by the concerned parties, as soon as possible, before the Arbitral Tribunal itself. Thus, after the decision of the Court, despite the proviso in the Section, the law has been restated by the Supreme Court as to be holding what the text states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                            (33) Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3751<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            In 1946, the then Government of Central Provinces and Berar, and the Government of Bombay, requested the Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission (CWINC) to take up investigations on the Narmada river system for basin-wise development of the river, with flood control, irrigation, power and extension of navigation as the objectives in view. The study commenced in 1947, and most of the sites were inspected by engineers and geologists, who recommended detailed investigation for seven projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Thereafter, in 1948, the Central Ministry of Works, Mines & Power appointed an Ad-hoc Committee headed by Shri A.N. Khosla, Chairman, CWINC, to study the projects and recommend priorities. This Ad-hoc Committee recommended, as an initial step, detailed investigations for certain projects, keeping in view the availability of men, materials and resources. Based on the recommendations of the aforesaid Ad-hoc Committee, estimates for investigations of the Bargi, Tawa, Punasa (Narmadasagar) and Broach Projects were sanctioned by the Government of India in March 1949.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Tribunal framed 24 issues, which included issues relating to Gujarat having a right to construct a high dam with FRL 530 feet and a canal with FSL 300 feet or thereabouts. Issues 1(a), 1(b), 1(A), 2, 3 and 19 were tried as preliminary issues of law, and by its decision dated 23 February 1972, the said issues were decided against the Respondents herein. It was held that the Notification of the Central Government dated 16 October 1969, referring the matters raised by the State of Rajasthan by its complaint, was ultra vires the Act; but the constitution of the Tribunal and the making of a reference of the water dispute regarding the inter-State river Narmada was not ultra vires the Act, and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it at the instance of the State of Gujarat. It further held that the proposed construction of the Navagam project, involving the consequent submergence of portions of the territories of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, could form the subject matter of a “water dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Against the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal on the preliminary issues, the States of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan filed appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court, and obtained a stay of the proceedings before the Tribunal to a limited extent. The Supreme Court directed that the proceedings before the Tribunal should be stayed, but that discovery, inspection and other miscellaneous proceedings before the Tribunal may go on. The State of Rajasthan was directed to participate in these interlocutory proceedings. The present Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed by the Narmada Bachao Andolan to challenge the said decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Petitioner argued: (a) that it was necessary for some independent judicial authority to review the entire project, and to examine the current best estimates of all costs (social, environmental, financial), benefits and alternatives, in order to determine whether the project was required in its present form in the national interest, or whether it needed to be restructured or modified; and (b) that no work should proceed till an environmental impact assessment had been fully done, and its implications for the project’s viability assessed in a transparent and participatory manner. This could, at best, be done only as a part of a comprehensive review of the project. This contention was partly supported by the State of Madhya Pradesh, insofar as it also pleaded for a reduction in the height of the dam, so as to reduce the extent of submergence and the consequent displacement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            This was refuted by the Respondent States. While accepting that initially the relief and rehabilitation measures had lagged behind, they argued that adequate steps had now been taken to ensure proper implementation of relief and rehabilitation, at least as per the Award. The Respondents also questioned the bona fides of the Petitioners in filing this petition. It was contended that the cause of the tribals and the environment was being taken up by the Petitioners not with a view to benefiting the tribals, but that the real reason for filing this petition was to see that a high dam was not erected per se<\/em>. It was also submitted that, at this late stage, the Court should not adjudicate on the various issues raised, especially those which had been decided by the Tribunal’s Award.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Supreme Court held: (a) that the Petitioners were not guilty of any laches in that regard; and (b) given what had been held in respect of the environmental clearance, when the public interest was so demonstrably involved, it would be against public interest to decline relief only on the ground that the Court was approached belatedly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Court declared that if, for any reason, the work on the Project \u2014 now or at any time in the future \u2014 could not proceed and the Project was not completed, then all the oustees who had been rehabilitated shall have the option to continue to reside where they had been rehabilitated, or to return to where they were ousted from, provided such place remained habitable; and they shall not be made liable in monetary or other terms on this account. The writ petition was accordingly allowed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The decision clearly lays down that the Court will not take any step in such a direction without examining the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the said project. The consequences of the project, and its effects, are the most important factors, without which clearance cannot be given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                            (34) Poonam Verma v. Dr. Ashwin Patel, AIR 1996 SC 2111<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            One Mr. Pramod Verma was treated for fever by Dr. Ashwin Patel, a homeopathic doctor. He used certain allopathic medicines, such as Inj. Diclofenac sodium, Tab. Ciprofloxacin 500 mg, Tab. Paracetamol, Tab. Diavol and Tab. B-complex. Even after nine days of treatment, the patient did not improve, and he was then taken to allopathic doctors, who also treated him; but the patient died on the tenth day. The widow of the deceased, Poonam Verma, filed a case against the doctor. The Judge did not proceed against the allopathic doctors, because they had practised their own system of medicine. The Judge declared that any doctor who practised and prescribed medicines about which he had not studied, and was not registered with the Council constituted by law, was a mere pretender to knowledge in that system, and was a quack. This was challenged before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Appellant sought to establish the liability of the doctor under: (a) the Consumer Protection Act, 1986; (b) the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; (c) the Maharashtra Medical Council Act, 1965; and (d) the Bombay Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1960. It was argued that “Like Cures Like” is the basis of homeopathy, whereas allopathy is quite the opposite. Pharmacology, which is the study of allopathic drugs, is not taught to homeopathic students.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Supreme Court held that the words “Registered Homeopathic Practitioner” must be mentioned in every clinic of a homeopathic doctor. The appeal was accordingly upheld, and the Court fined the Respondent \u20b93 lakhs, payable to the wife of the deceased. Further, the Medical Council of India was directed to punish the homeopathic doctor for violating the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. In consequence thereof, the Respondent was sentenced to a period of three years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            This judgment holds that “cross-practising” by doctors of different systems of medicine is illegal. Even allopathic doctors must not practise Ayurveda, and vice versa. If any doctor prescribes medicines on a subject which was not taught to him, he can be imprisoned by virtue of this case. However, this judgment seems to have been partially overruled by Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab<\/em>, (2005) 6 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that a doctor is not liable unless gross negligence is proved against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                            (35) Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Petitioner was a “small human rights activist, fighting for good causes in the general public interest,” and filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution. The case was filed on the basis of a report entitled “Law helps the injured to die,” published in the Hindustan Times<\/em>. In the said publication, it was alleged that a scooterist had been knocked down by a speeding car. Seeing the profusely bleeding scooterist, a person who was on the road picked up the injured man and took him to the nearest hospital. The doctors refused to attend to the injured man and told the man that he should take the patient to a different, named hospital located some 20 kilometres away, authorised to handle medico-legal cases. The Samaritan carried the victim and lost no time in approaching the other hospital, but before he could reach it, the victim succumbed to his injuries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            It was contended by the Union of India that the prevailing police rules and the Criminal Procedure Code necessitated the fulfilment of several legal formalities before a victim could be rendered medical aid. The rationale behind this complicated procedure was to keep all evidence intact. In case the formalities were not observed, the doctors were harassed by the police, and they were therefore reluctant to accept medico-legal cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Petitioner argued that it was a part of professional ethics to start treating the patient as soon as he was brought before the doctor for medical attention, inasmuch as it was the paramount obligation of the doctor to save human life and bring the patient out of the risk zone at the earliest, with a view to preserving life. He also submitted that the formalities under the Criminal Procedure Code, or any other local laws, should not stand in the way of medical practitioners attending to an injured person; and that it should be the duty of a doctor in each and every casualty department of a hospital to attend to such a person first, and thereafter take care of the formalities under the Criminal Procedure Code. “The life of a person is far more important than the legal formalities.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Court held that there can be no second opinion that the preservation of human life was of paramount importance. That is so on account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo ante could not be restored, as resurrection was beyond the capacity of man. The patient \u2014 whether he be an innocent person or a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of society \u2014 it is the obligation of those who are in charge of the health of the community to preserve life, so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Article 21 of the Constitution casts the obligation on the State to preserve life. The provision, as explained by this Court in scores of decisions, has emphasised and reiterated \u2014 with gradually increasing emphasis \u2014 that position. A doctor at a Government hospital, positioned to meet this State obligation, is therefore duty-bound to extend medical assistance for preserving life. Every doctor, whether at a Government hospital or otherwise, has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life. No law or State action can intervene to avoid or delay the discharge of the paramount obligation cast upon members of the medical profession. The obligation being total, absolute and paramount, laws of procedure \u2014 whether in statutes or otherwise \u2014 which would interfere with the discharge of this obligation cannot be sustained, and must therefore give way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Court directed that the decision shall be published in all journals reporting decisions of this Court, and that adequate publicity highlighting these aspects should be given by the national media, as also through Doordarshan and All India Radio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Court also directed persons in the medical profession that the apprehensions about being a witness, facing police interrogation, and spending a long time facing unnecessary cross-examination and humiliation \u2014 even if they have some foundation \u2014 should not prevent them from discharging their duty as medical professionals to save a human life. A direction was also issued to the police to take greater care and see to it that medical practitioners are not unnecessarily harassed in such cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Court further held that when, on such occasions, a man of the medical profession is approached, and if he finds that whatever assistance he could give is not sufficient really to save the life of the person, but that some better assistance is necessarily available, it is also the duty of the man in the medical profession so approached to render all the help which he could, and also to see that the person reaches the proper expert as early as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            This case has brought the “right to get medical care” within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution as a fundamental right. As a result, every person in India gets the right to approach any hospital and get medical aid, even when the legal formalities have not been complied with. Consequently, the number of deaths occurring due to the refusal of doctors to treat patients \u2014 where it is a case of an accident or any criminal case \u2014 will go down, and the doctor will be justified in being regarded as the saviour of human life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                            (36) People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2002) 5 SCC 294<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The petition raised the question before the Supreme Court: Whether, before casting votes, voters have a right to know relevant particulars of their candidates?<\/em> In short, the Court was to consider “whether or not an elector, a citizen of the country, has a fundamental right to receive information regarding the criminal activities of a candidate to the Lok Sabha or Legislative Assembly, for making an estimate for himself as to whether the person contesting the election has a background making him worthy of his vote, by peeping into the past of the candidate.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            This contention was raised by the Association of Democratic Reforms, firstly before the Delhi High Court, basing their argument on: (a) the Report of the Vohra Committee of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs; and (b) the 170th Law Commission Report. The Delhi High Court held that “for making a right choice, it is essential that the past of the candidate should not be kept in the dark, as it is not in the interest of democracy and the well-being of the country.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Aggrieved by this decision, the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court, wherein it was submitted that till suitable amendments were made in the Representation of the People Act and the Rules thereunder, the High Court should not have given any direction to the Election Commission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                            The Supreme Court directed the Election Commission to call for information from each candidate seeking election to Parliament or a State Legislature, as a necessary part of his nomination paper, furnishing therein information on the following aspects in relation to his or her candidature:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              \n
                                                            • Whether the candidate is convicted, acquitted or discharged of any criminal offence in the past, if any, and whether he was punished with imprisonment or fine.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                            • Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the candidate is accused in any pending case, of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by a Court of law. If so, the details thereof.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                            • The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances, etc.) of a candidate, and of his or her spouse and dependants.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                            • Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any overdues of any public financial institution or Government dues.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                            • The educational qualifications of the candidate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              This judgment has entitled every citizen to know the full particulars of the candidate who is to represent him, as a fundamental right. Such practices bring about transparency in governance, and also allow the voter to exercise his right to vote judiciously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              \n\n\n\n

                                                              (37) Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was preferred by six persons who purported to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling textbooks for different classes in the schools of Punjab. It was alleged that the Education Department of the Punjab Government, in pursuance of its so-called policy of nationalisation of textbooks, had issued a series of notifications since 1950 regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books, which had not only placed unwarrantable restrictions upon the rights of the Petitioners to carry on their business, but had practically ousted them and other fellow-traders from the business altogether.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              It was submitted that no restrictions could be imposed upon the Petitioners’ right to carry on trade, which was guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, by mere executive orders without proper legislation; and that the legislation, if any, must conform to the requirements of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications which had affected their rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              It was contended that the executive Government of a State was wholly incompetent, without any legislative sanction, to engage in any trade or business activity; and that the acts of the Government in carrying out their policy of establishing a monopoly in the business of printing and publishing textbooks for school students were wholly without jurisdiction and illegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              It was argued that, assuming the State could create a monopoly in its favour in respect of a particular trade or business, this could be done not by any executive act, but only by means of proper legislation, which should conform to the requirements of Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It was further argued that it was not open to the Government to deprive the Petitioners of their interest in any business or undertaking \u2014 which amounts to property \u2014 without authority of law, and without payment of compensation as required under Article 31 of the Constitution. It was also argued that the Government had no power in law to carry on the business of printing or selling textbooks for the use of school students, in competition with private agencies, without the sanction of the legislature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the executive wing of the State could issue such notifications regulating or restricting the rights of the Petitioners from carrying on the trade of publishing books. The Court held that the power of the Executive was co-extensive with that of the legislature, as provided for under Article 162 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Court held, such a restriction on the right to carry on trade and profession, as provided for in Article 19(1)(g), could be placed by the Executive without there being a law to enforce the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              The judgment in the instant case makes the proposition beyond doubt that the power of the Executive is co-extensive with that of the legislature, and thus the Executive is empowered to carry on measures and exercise the powers as vested in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              \n\n\n\n

                                                              (38) Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, AIR 2002 SC 177<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              The matter first came to the Supreme Court in the form of a civil appeal, and was decided thereon. A review petition was subsequently filed to review the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the civil appeal. This review petition was dismissed. The Petitioner then filed a writ petition under Article 32, questioning the validity of the judgment delivered in the civil appeal. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred the said writ petition to a Constitution Bench of five Judges, wherein the precise issue was: Whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of a review petition, either under Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                              The following was submitted before the Supreme Court:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                \n
                                                              • That the principle of finality or certainty of the judgments of the Supreme Court has its own importance, but it was now required to be circumvented, and the case should be re-examined where the orders were passed without jurisdiction, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, violation of any fundamental rights, or where there had been a gross injustice.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                              • That the Supreme Court had inherent jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (precisely Order 47 Rule 6); therefore, cases falling in the aforementioned categories should be examined under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                                                                  \n
                                                                1. That the provisions of Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 were a mere restatement of the provisions of Article 137 of the Constitution, and that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court could be exercised to remedy the injustice suffered by a person.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                2. That Article 129 of the Constitution declared the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record, so that it would have inherent powers to pass appropriate orders to undo injustice to any party resulting from a judgment of the Court.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
                                                                    \n
                                                                  • That since the Supreme Court was a creature of the Constitution, such that the corrective power was to be derived from the provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, like Articles 32 and 129\u2013140, such a power did not arise from an abstract inherent jurisdiction. It was also contended that the corrective power was a species of the review power, and that Articles 129 and 137, and Order 40 Rule 5 and Order 47 Rules 1 and 6, indicated that the Court had inherent power to set right its own judgment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                                    Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                    The Constitution Bench held that a final judgment or order passed by the Supreme Court could not be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 could not be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment or order passed by the Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137, read with Order 41 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                    However, the Supreme Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, could reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power \u2014 but only in the rarest of cases, where such injustice was manifest, or where the orders had been passed without jurisdiction. The curative petition was to contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of the above requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                    For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                    The judgment lays down important propositions of law. Therefore:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                      \n
                                                                    1. A final judgment or order passed by the Supreme Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                    2. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment or order passed by the Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution, read with Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                    3. The Supreme Court may reconsider its judgments by exercising its inherent powers in case of gross injustice, but only if certain conditions have been satisfied:\n
                                                                        \n
                                                                      • The Petitioner must establish a violation of natural justice \u2014 that his interest had been affected, though he was not made a party to it; or that he was not served a notice; or that he was not heard, though he was served a notice.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                      • The Petitioner would be entitled to relief if a member of the Bench that passed the judgment failed to disclose his connection with the subject matter; or if the parties provide an apprehension of bias. The judgment should be such that it adversely affects the Petitioner.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                      • The curative petition must be certified by a Senior Advocate to ensure that the requirements are fulfilled.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
                                                                        \n\n\n\n

                                                                        (39) S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        This case dealt with two major issues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        (a) Whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in service matters specified in Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in such service matters in the Administrative Tribunal \u2014 subject to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136 \u2014 was constitutionally permitted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        (b) Whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members had the effect of introducing a constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The case is of seminal importance, as the Supreme Court \u2014 relying on Minerva Mills v. Union of India<\/em>, AIR 1986 SC 2030 \u2014 declared that it was well settled that judicial review was a basic and essential feature of the Constitution. If the power of judicial review were absolutely taken away, the Constitution would cease to be what it was.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court further declared that if a law made under Article 323A(1) were to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure, and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court concluded by holding that the same independence from executive pressure or influence must be ensured to the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Administrative Tribunal; otherwise, the Administrative Tribunal would cease to be an equally effective and efficacious substitute for the High Court, and the provisions of the impugned Act would be rendered invalid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court did not strike down the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, but \u2014 while making the judgment prospective \u2014 gave the Central Government an opportunity to amend the Act suitably within the stipulated time, to remove the difficulties found in the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The judgment at that time was of particular importance, as it sought to open ways for an alternative dispute resolution mechanism which, strictly speaking, did not fall within the ambit of courts. However, the impact of the judgment has been mitigated, as it has been overruled by L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India<\/em>, AIR 1997 SC 1125.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        \n\n\n\n

                                                                        (40) Sakshi v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 3566<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        This writ petition was filed by Sakshi, a women’s organisation, in the Apex Court, seeking the issuance of a writ declaring that “sexual intercourse,” as contained in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), included all forms of penetration \u2014 such as penile\/vaginal penetration, penile\/oral penetration, penile\/anal penetration, finger\/vaginal and finger\/anal penetration, and object\/vaginal penetration \u2014 and for the issuance of a direction for the registration of all such cases as falling under Sections 375, 376, 376A and 376D of the IPC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        It was contended by the Petitioner organisation that the existing trend of the Respondent authorities to treat sexual violence other than penile\/vaginal penetration as lesser offences, falling under either Section 377 or Section 354 IPC, and not as sexual violence under Sections 375 and 376 IPC, was without any justification. It was also submitted that a limited understanding of “rape” as abuse by penile\/vaginal penetration only was contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual abuse law, as it denied the majority of women and children access to adequate redress, in violation of Articles 14 and 21. It was contended that the registration of cases of sexual violence as cases of moral turpitude under Section 377 by the Respondent authorities was without any justification, as these cases would otherwise fall within the scope and ambit of Sections 375 and 376.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Supreme Court concluded that although Sections 354, 375 and 377 of the IPC had come up for consideration before superior courts of the country on innumerable occasions, the wide definition which the Petitioner wanted to be given to “rape” as defined in Section 375 IPC \u2014 so that the same might become an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC \u2014 had neither been considered nor accepted by any Court in India so far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court observed that the prosecution of an accused for an offence under Section 376 IPC, on a radically enlarged meaning of Section 375 IPC, would violate the guarantee enshrined in Article 20(1), which states that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for the violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Therefore, the Apex Court held that an exercise to alter the definition of rape, as contained in Section 375 IPC, by a process of judicial interpretation \u2014 and that too when there was no ambiguity in the provisions of the enactment \u2014 was bound to result in a good deal of chaos and confusion, and would not be in the interest of society at large.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Upon the aspect of the petition seeking directions to be issued to the Government and the police to ensure the protection of a victim of sexual abuse at the time of recording his statement in Court, the Court noted that since Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) merely required evidence to be taken in the presence of the accused, and did not require that the evidence should be recorded in such a manner that the accused should have a full view of the victim or the witnesses, directions were issued that the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 327 CrPC would, in addition to the offences mentioned in the sub-section, also apply to the inquiry or trial of offences under Sections 354 and 377 of the IPC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Herein the Court also took note of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai<\/em>, (2003) 4 SCC 601, wherein the recording of evidence by way of video conferencing, vis-\u00e0-vis Section 273 CrPC, was held to be permissible; and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh<\/em>, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein directions were given to hold the trial of rape cases in camera, and that the trial be conducted by lady judges wherever available, so that the prosecutrix can make her statement with greater ease.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Dismissing the petition, the Court showed its inability to extend the statutory definition of “rape” as provided under the Indian Penal Code (Section 375), holding that it was only within the competence of the legislature to extend the definition. The Court’s observation that it would not be in the larger interest of the State or the people to alter the definition of “rape” as contained in Section 375 IPC by a process of judicial interpretation also shows the Court’s concern for maintaining national peace and tranquillity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        \n\n\n\n

                                                                        (41) Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 SCC 373<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Petitioner, Sheela Barse, was a Bombay-based journalist who had sought permission to interview women prisoners in the Maharashtra jails. When she wanted to conduct tape-recorded interviews, she was asked to take down notes only. Later, the Petitioner was informed that the grant of permission for an interview was a matter of the discretion of the Inspector General, and that such interviews were ordinarily allowed only to research scholars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Petitioner then made a grievance over the withdrawal of the permission, and pleaded that it is the citizen’s right to know whether the Government is administering the jails in accordance with law. The Petitioner’s letter was treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        According to the Petitioner, Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 guaranteed to every citizen reasonable access to information about the institutions that formulate, enact, implement and enforce the laws of the land. It was argued that every citizen had a right to receive such information through public institutions, including the media, as it was physically impossible for every citizen to be informed about all issues of public importance individually and personally. She contended that, as a journalist, she had the right to collect and disseminate information to citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Respondents opposed the petition, pleading that interviews with prisoners were governed by the rules made in the Maharashtra Prison Manual, and since the Petitioner did not satisfy the prescription, it was justified in revoking the permission to have interviews with prisoners. It was also submitted that, normally, the prison authorities did not allow interviews with prisoners unless the person seeking the interview was a research scholar studying for a Ph.D., or intended to visit the prison as a part of the field work of a curriculum prescribed for a post-graduate course, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Further, it was submitted that there were no rules for permitting interviews except to relatives and legal advisers, for facilitating the defence of prisoners. The State contended that if an unguided and uncontrolled right of visit were provided to citizens, it would be difficult to maintain discipline, and the very purpose of keeping delinquents in prison would be frustrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court held that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guaranteed to all citizens freedom of speech and expression, was not the point in issue; but the enlarged meaning given to the provisions of Article 21 by the Court in a few earlier cases was found to be relevant. The Apex Court stated that “life” in Article 21 had to be given an extended meaning, wherein those citizens who were detained in prisons, either as undertrials or as convicts, were also entitled to the benefit of the guarantees, subject to reasonable restrictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court observed that the public gaze should be directed to such matters, and that pressmen, as friends of society and public-spirited citizens, should have access not only to information but also to interviews. The Court therefore permitted public access to prisons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court, giving the dividing line, observed that citizens did not have any right either under Article 19(1)(a) or Article 21 to enter into jails for the collection of information; but in order that the guarantee of the fundamental right under Article 21 might be available to the citizens detained in jails, it became necessary to permit citizens’ access to information, as also interviews with prisoners. Interviews become necessary, as otherwise the correct information may not be collected; but such access had to be controlled and regulated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Hence, the Petitioner’s claim that she was entitled to an uncontrolled interview was not accepted. The Court held that there may be cases where such tape-recording was necessary, but the Court made it clear that tape-recording should be subject to the special permission of the appropriate authority. The Petitioner was accordingly directed to make an application to the prescribed authority for the requisite permission, which was to be dealt with by the authorities in the light of the guidelines laid down in the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Apex Court permitted public access to the jails for the purposes of interviewing, and declared that the same was not to be an unrestricted and uncontrolled right. The Court directed that this right was to be guided by several factors, including abidance by reasonable prison rules and jail manuals. The case also provided guidelines which the authorities have to keep in mind while considering an application made by press people for the purposes of taking any interview of a prisoner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        It has further to be understood that interviews cannot be forced, and the willingness of the prisoners to be interviewed would always be insisted upon. The interviews which are taken have further to be cross-checked and verified by the authorities before they become public, so as to ensure that only the correct information ultimately reaches the masses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        \n\n\n\n

                                                                        (42) Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Respondent was a student of Baptist College, Kohima, where the Appellant was a lecturer. The Appellant used to visit the Respondent’s home often, and voluntarily confessed his love for her. The Respondent, blinded by the false assurances of marriage given by the Appellant, agreed to have a conjugal relationship with him, and as a result thereof became pregnant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Thereupon, the Respondent \u2014 being afraid of a social scandal \u2014 started pressurising the Appellant to marry her. Upon this, the Appellant “married” her in front of the God he worshipped in his home, by applying sindur to her forehead and accepting her as his legally wedded wife.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        After these incidents, the accused kept trying to convince the Respondent that she should get the child aborted; and on her not being convinced, he used the plea that his parents would not be convinced to accept her as their daughter-in-law if they had the child. As a result, the Respondent was compelled to undergo an abortion. The same story was repeated in April 1994, and here the Appellant even misrepresented himself as “Bikash Gautam” at the nursing home in Dimapur where the Respondent was taken for her abortion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Respondent believed herself to be the legally wedded wife of the Appellant in full faith, and never once questioned the excuses given by the Appellant. On hearing that the Appellant was going to Silchar to join the job at the Government College that they had both been waiting for \u2014 so that they could make their marriage known in public \u2014 the Respondent went to meet him, to be taken along with him; whereupon the Appellant refused, point blank, to accept their relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Thereafter, the Respondent brought an action against the Appellant on the grounds of criminal offences under the Indian Penal Code, Sections 312, 420, 493, 496 and 498A. On these facts, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the Appellant against the order of the High Court of Assam at Guwahati, which had declined to dismiss the criminal case filed by the Respondent against the Appellant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Appellant sought to evade the cases on the grounds that: (a) the Appellant was unemployed, his service having been terminated from the Government College at Silchar; and (b) the whole case had no factual basis, but was cooked up to defame him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Supreme Court, upholding the decision of the High Court, refused to quash the proceedings of the pending criminal case and dismissed the petition, while also awarding an interim maintenance of \u20b91,000 per month to the Respondent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The question before the Court \u2014 whether the Court was competent to pass any further orders in the present case and compel the present Appellant to pay interim maintenance to the Respondent during the pendency of the criminal trial<\/em> \u2014 was decided in the affirmative, on the ground that the Supreme Court enjoyed a wide range of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, which included the power to award compensation for the violation of Fundamental Rights as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Court also declared that the crime of “rape” was not only a penal cause of action, but one that was a crime against basic human rights, and was a violation of the most cherished Right to Life of the victim. Therefore, relying upon the decision in Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India<\/em>, (1995) 1 SCC 14, the Court concluded that while trying a case relating to the penal offence of rape, a court had the jurisdiction to award compensation at the final stage; and there was also no bar to awarding interim compensation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        This case lays down the law that interim compensation can be awarded to victims of rape during trials, considering the gravity of the situation and in the interests of justice. It thus marks a progressive shift in criminal law jurisprudence, wherein a victimological approach has been introduced into the adjudicatory process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        \n\n\n\n

                                                                        (43) Smt. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 1257<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The Appellant, Gian Kaur, and her husband were convicted by the Trial Court for abetment of the suicide of one Kulwant Kaur. The Appellant challenged the conviction, contending that Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was unconstitutional. The said challenge was based upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in P. Rathinam v. Union of India<\/em>, (1994) 3 SCC 394, wherein Section 309 of the IPC had been declared unconstitutional as being violative of Article 21. The matter was raised before a Division Bench of the Court, which \u2014 considering the importance of the issue \u2014 referred it to a Constitution Bench of five Judges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                        The following arguments were raised before the Supreme Court:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                          \n
                                                                        1. The Appellants contended that the “right to die” had become a fundamental right under Article 21 after the decision in P. Rathinam<\/em>, and therefore Section 306 of the IPC, which did not allow another to assist in the enforcement of this fundamental right to die, was unconstitutional.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                        2. They also submitted that since it was settled that Article 21 had a wide meaning, wherein the term “life” does not mean “mere animal existence” but “right to live with human dignity,” embracing the quality of life, it must logically follow that the right to live would include the right not to live \u2014 that is, the right to die, or to terminate one’s life.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                        3. As an amicus curiae<\/em>, Fali J. Nariman submitted that Article 21 could not be construed to include within it the so-called “right to die,” since Article 21 guaranteed the protection of life and liberty, and not its extinction.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                        4. Another amicus curiae<\/em>, Soli J. Sorabjee, submitted that Section 306 could survive independently of Section 309 of the IPC, as it did not violate either Article 14 or Article 21, as was the case with Section 309.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                                                                          Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                          The Supreme Court negated the contention that the right to life included the right to terminate one’s life. It observed that “the right to die,” if any, is inherently inconsistent with the “right to life,” as inconsistent as is “death with life.” Thus, it overruled the decision in P. Rathinam<\/em>, and Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code were declared to be constitutional. The Court specifically rejected the argument of mercy killing or euthanasia as not permissible in India, owing to the protection given under Article 21.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                          For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                          The judgment is consequential on account of the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n
                                                                          1. The Court observed that the protection under Article 21 was of a protective nature, and thus could not be read so as to make the right to live with dignity be interpreted as the right to end one’s life if one was not capable of dignified existence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                          2. Article 21 was characterised as having a positive content only, as contrary to other fundamental rights which could be interpreted both positively as well as negatively \u2014 such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of business, etc., wherein the right to do included the right not to do.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                          3. The “right to commit suicide” (or “to die”) was held to be not available in India, on account of the specific restriction under Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                          4. This case is an illustrious example of the doctrine of eclipse<\/strong>. The unconstitutionality imposed on Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code in P. Rathinam<\/em> was reversed in this case, and thus a law which was void and inapplicable was rendered valid and applicable again. The Section remained a dead law during the interval, but it did not cease to exist.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have reaffirmed the view that the life of an individual is not his own, but belongs to society. Thus, it being in the interests of society, he shall not be allowed to end it prematurely, prior to a natural end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                                            (44) Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            There were four petitions in this case under Article 32 of the Constitution, which were clubbed together for hearing. The common questions for consideration before the Apex Court were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (a) Whether a Hindu husband, married under Hindu law, by embracing Islam, could solemnise a second marriage?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (b) Whether such a marriage \u2014 without having the first marriage dissolved under law \u2014 would be a valid marriage qua the first wife, who continued to be Hindu?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (c) Whether the apostate husband would be guilty of the offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Apex Court observed that a second marriage by an apostate, under the shelter of conversion to Islam, would nevertheless be a marriage in violation of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, by which he would continue to be governed so far as his first marriage under the Act was concerned, despite his conversion to Islam.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The second marriage of an apostate would therefore be an illegal marriage qua his wife, who had married him under the Act and continued to be a Hindu. Between the apostate and his Hindu wife, the second marriage was in violation of the provisions of the Act, and as such would be non-est.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Further, the Court stated that it was no doubt correct that the marriage solemnised by a Hindu husband after embracing Islam may not strictly be a void marriage under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, because he was no longer a Hindu; but the fact remained that the said marriage would be in violation of the Hindu Marriage Act, which strictly professes monogamy. The real reason for the voidness of the second marriage was the subsistence of the first marriage, which was not dissolved even by the conversion of the husband. It would be giving a go-by to the substance of the matter, and acting against the spirit of the Statute, if the second marriage of the convert were held to be legal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            This case categorically establishes that conversion of religion merely for the purpose of marrying again by any person is not allowed, and the second marriage will be void in such a case, while the concerned person would be liable for committing bigamy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Further, the judgment stressed the need for acting upon Article 44 of the Constitution, which calls for a Uniform Civil Code. The Court observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n

                                                                            “Successive Governments till-date have been wholly remiss in their duty of implementing the constitutional mandate under Article 44 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, request the Government of India through the Prime Minister of the country to have a fresh look at Article 44 of the Constitution of India and endeavour to secure to the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            However, it is sad to note that the situation remains unchanged even after a decade of this judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                                            (45) Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Expressing doubt over the correctness of the judgment in Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd.<\/em>, (2003) 11 SCC 405, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court referred the issue \u2014 Whether a company or a corporate body could be prosecuted for offences for which the sentence of imprisonment is a mandatory punishment<\/em> \u2014 to a Constitution Bench of the Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The aspect of interpretation revolved around Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), which provided for a mandatory punishment of fine and imprisonment for certain offences. Thus, the dispute arose as to whether, in the case of corporate bodies, which could not be imprisoned, the sentence could be imposed at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Calling for a literal interpretation, the Appellants submitted that since the punishment provided was both “imprisonment and fine,” the Court could not impose only a “fine.” Both fine and imprisonment must be imposed. But since imprisoning a juristic entity was impossible, the law under consideration could not be made functional by initiating prosecution under it. Therefore, it was argued that corporates could not be punished under the said Section at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            By a 3:2 majority, the Supreme Court overruled the case of Velliappa Textiles Ltd.<\/em>, declaring that there was no immunity to companies from prosecution merely because the prosecution was in respect of offences for which the punishment prescribed was mandatory imprisonment along with a fine. It was pointed out, with reference to Section 56 of FERA, that though punishment by way of imprisonment and fine was mandatory, prosecution would not be crippled merely because imprisonment of corporates was impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            This case clearly sets down the position that no one is above the law. A juristic entity would not be exempted from prosecution merely on the ground that the penal sanction on it would be in the nature of fine and imprisonment together. Thus, invoking the doctrine of impossibility, and bringing out an interpretation that made the Section workable and applicable, the Court declared that though a corporation cannot be imprisoned, it can surely be fined, and prosecution was permissible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                                            (46) State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The precise issue which arose for consideration in the present case was: Whether prisoners, who were required to do labour as part of their punishment, should necessarily be paid wages for such work at the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages law?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The appeals were made by various State Governments against the decisions of their High Courts, wherein it had been held that prisoners should be paid wages, and that the then-prevailing rates of wages paid to them were too meagre and were therefore liable to be enhanced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            It was argued that: (a) when hard labour was made a part of punishment as lawfully imposed, it could be equated with the normal employer-employee phenomenon, so as to entitle the prisoner to the social and legislative benefits which a free employee gets outside the walls of the prison; (b) Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution clearly declared the “Right against Exploitation,” wherein there was an absolute prohibition against “forced labour” \u2014 an expression which seemed to be collocated with the word “begar”; and (c) under Article 21, like any other workman, a prisoner was also entitled to wages, and therefore the only question that remained to be considered was at what rate prisoners should be paid for their work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Court specifically declared that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (a) It was lawful to employ prisoners sentenced to rigorous imprisonment to do hard labour, whether they consented to do it or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (b) It was open to the jail officials to permit other prisoners also to do any work which they chose to do, provided such prisoners made a request for that purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (c) It was imperative that prisoners should be paid equitable wages for the work done by them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            (d) In order to determine the quantum of equitable wages payable to prisoners, the State concerned should constitute a wage fixation body for making recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Court therefore directed the State Governments to fix the wage rate; and until the State Government had taken any decision on such recommendations, every prisoner was to be paid wages for the work done by him at such rates or revised rates as the Government concerned fixed, in the light of the observations made above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Court also recommended that the States concerned make a law for setting apart a portion of the wages earned by prisoners, to be paid as compensation to deserving victims of the offence the commission of which entailed the sentence of imprisonment to the prisoner \u2014 either directly, or through a common fund to be created for this purpose, or in any other feasible mode.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Another aspect of the judgment is the victimological approach it adopts. It observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n

                                                                            “Rehabilitation of the prisoner need not be by closing the eyes towards the suffering victims of the offence. A glimpse at the field of Victimology reveals two types of victims: (a) direct victims, i.e., those who are alive and suffering on account of the harm inflicted by the prisoner while committing the crime; (b) indirect victims, i.e., those who are dependants of the direct victims of crimes, who undergo sufferings due to deprivation of their breadwinner. Restorative and reparative theories have developed from the aforesaid thinking. These are not theories of punishment. Rather, their argument is that sentences should move away from punishment of the offender towards restitution and reparation, aimed at restoring the harm done and calculated accordingly. Restorative theories are therefore victim-centred, although in some versions they encompass the notion of reparation to the community for the effects of crime. They envisage less resort to custody, with onerous community-based sanctions requiring offenders to work in order to compensate victims, and also contemplating support and counselling for offenders to reintegrate them into the community. Such theories therefore tend to act on a behavioural premise similar to rehabilitation, but their political premise is that compensation for victims should be recognised as more important than notions of just punishment on behalf of the State. Legal systems based on a restorative rationale are rare, but the increasing tendency to insert victim-orientated measures such as compensation orders into sentencing systems structured to impose punishment provides a fine example of Garland’s observation that ‘institutions are the scenes of particular conflicts as well as being means to a variety of ends, so it is no surprise to find that each particular institution combines a number of often incompatible objectives, and organises the relations of often antagonistic interest groups.'”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The importance of the case lies in the thrust it gives to victimological jurisprudence in our country. It set a trend in sentencing policy towards listening to the wailings of the victims. Further, the judgment is also hailed for acknowledging the existence of the human rights of prisoners, and their entitlement to remuneration for the work they did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                                            (47) State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            When the general elections for the Lok Sabha took place in 1977, the Congress Party was badly routed in several States by the Janata Party, which won and formed the Government at the Centre. In these States, Congress Governments were functioning at the time, and they still had more time to run before the completion of their full term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Central Home Minister, Charan Singh, wrote a letter to each of the Chief Ministers of the States, suggesting that they should seek dissolution of the State Legislature from the Governor and obtain a fresh mandate from the electorate. The State of Rajasthan, along with several other affected States, filed an original suit under Article 131 of the Constitution against the Union of India, praying the Court to declare this directive of the Central Home Minister as unconstitutional and illegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            It was argued that the letter of the Central Home Minister was a prelude to the invocation of Article 356 in these States, and that the dissolution of the State Legislatures on the ground mentioned in the said letter was prima facie<\/em> outside the purview of Article 356. In substance, the suit was designed to forestall the invocation of Article 356 in the concerned States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Court observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n

                                                                            “The satisfaction under Article 356 is a subjective one and cannot be tested by reference to any objective tests or by judicially discoverable or manageable standards.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Upon the facts, the Court concluded that it could not go into the correctness or adequacy of the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction of the Central Government is based. However, one thing was certain: if the satisfaction was mala fide, or was based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds, the Court would have the jurisdiction to examine it \u2014 because in that case, there would be no satisfaction of the President in regard to the matter in which he is required to be satisfied (under Article 356, for the dissolution of the State Legislature).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Supreme Court held, therefore, that the State Legislature could be dissolved without the President’s proclamation having been approved by Parliament. Any such proclamation came into immediate effect, and remained in force for two months without Parliamentary approval. The Court also rejected the contention that the proclamation could not be issued when either or both Houses of Parliament were in session.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            It was further held that even if Parliament disapproved the proclamation within the said period of two months, the proclamation continued to be valid for two months; and that even if both Houses did not approve or disapprove the proclamation, the Governments which had been dismissed, or the Assembly which may have been dissolved, did not revive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The broad position laid down by the Supreme Court was that it could not interfere with the Centre’s exercise of power under Article 356 of the Constitution of India merely on the ground that it embraced political and executive policy and expediency \u2014 unless some constitutional provision was infringed, showing that the Presidential satisfaction (under Article 356) was mala fide, or was based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            \n\n\n\n

                                                                            (48) Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The Petitioner, a convict under sentence of death lodged in Tihar Central Jail, came to know of a crime of torture practised upon another prisoner (Prem Chand), allegedly by a jail warder (Maggar Singh), as a means to extract money from the victim through his visiting relatives. This was complained of by the Petitioner to a Judge of the Supreme Court through a letter. The Court treated it as a petition within the fold of Article 32 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                            The issues that persisted before the Supreme Court were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n
                                                                            • Whether the Court had the jurisdiction to consider a prisoner’s grievance that did not demand release, but complained \u2014 within the incarceratory circumstances \u2014 of ill-treatment and curtailment short of illegal detention?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                            • What were the broad contours of the fundamental rights, especially Articles 14, 19 and 21, which belong to a detainee sentenced by a Court?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                            • What judicial remedies were to be granted to prevent and punish their breach, and to provide access to prison justice?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                            • What prison reform perspectives and strategies should be adopted to strengthen, in the long run, the constitutional mandates and human rights imperatives?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Supreme Court declared that it had the jurisdiction to consider a prisoner’s grievance that did not demand release, but complained \u2014 within the incarceratory circumstances \u2014 of ill-treatment and curtailment short of illegal detention. The Court expressly noted that prisoners were also human beings, and that fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison, although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Court held that it had the power and responsibility to intervene and protect the prisoner against mayhem \u2014 crude or subtle \u2014 and may use the writ of habeas corpus for enforcing in-prison humanism, and for forbidding harsher restraints and heavier severities than the sentence carries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Court held that the integrity of the physical person and mental personality was the most important right of a prisoner. Thereupon, the Court held that Prem Chand, the prisoner, had been tortured illegally, and the Superintendent could not absolve himself from responsibility even though he may not have been directly a party to it. The State was directed to take action against the erring officials. The Court also laid down guidelines to protect the rights of the prisoner, and to allow him a peaceful and respectful life without any room for torture inside the prison.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Assuming a legislative role, and providing for the interests of prisoners, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the protection of the rights of prisoners. It also put forth the pressing need for prison reforms. Suggestions were given, such as the keeping of a grievance box, with the help of which free access was to be afforded to every inmate in each ward \u2014 the box being kept locked and sealed by the District Magistrate, and on his periodical visit, he alone, or his surrogate, was supposed to open the box, find out the grievances, investigate their merits, and take remedial action, if justified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Various rules in relation to the Jail Manual were found to be insufficient as far as the protection of the convict’s rights were concerned. Stress was laid on the need for Courts to be dynamic and diversified in meeting out remedies to prisoners. Not merely the contempt power, but also the power to create ad hoc mechanisms and use the services of officers of justice was to be brought into play.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The problems prevailing in Tihar Jail \u2014 such as overcrowding, non-accommodation, etc. \u2014 were taken note of, and concerns were raised. A greater need was felt for expeditious prison reforms and the protection of the rights of prisoners. The Court thus stood tall in defending the rights of prisoners inside prisons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n\n\n\n

                                                                              (49) Vincent v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 990<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Petitioner filed a Public Interest Litigation alleging that the drugs industry in India was dominated by multi-national corporations originally based in the U.S.A., U.K., the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Japan, France and the like. According to the Petitioner, these corporations had large resources and made huge profits. The control exercised by the Government in this country over such corporations was minimal and inadequate, and the disease-prone sub-continent of India was being used as a pasture ground by these corporations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Hathi Committee, appointed by the Central Government, in its Report submitted in 1974, highlighted the havoc played by these corporations in India, and pleaded for nationalising the drug industry in the best interest of the Indian people. The recommendation was not accepted by the Government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              According to the Petitioner, several drugs banned in the advanced West after appropriate analytical research were routed to India, and \u2014 on account of lack of control and sluggish enforcement of the law \u2014 conveniently found their way into the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              It was submitted that what was poison to the human body in the West was equally poison to the people in India; but not knowing the repercussions thereof on the human system, such drugs were freely circulated and were even prescribed for patients. The Petitioner therefore sought directions from the Supreme Court, in the public interest, towards banning the import, manufacture, sale and distribution of such drugs as had been recommended for banning by the Drugs Consultative Committee, and the cancellation of all licences authorising the import, manufacture, sale and distribution of such drugs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Having regard to the magnitude, complexity and technical nature of the enquiry involved in the matter, and keeping in view the far-reaching implications of the total ban on certain medicines for which the Petitioner had prayed, the Supreme Court observed that a judicial proceeding of the nature sought was not an appropriate one for the determination of such matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Nevertheless, stating the importance of sound health, Ranganath Misra, J., observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n

                                                                              “A healthy body is the very foundation for all human activities. In a welfare state, therefore, it is the obligation of the State to ensure the creation and the sustaining of conditions congenial to good health. Attending to public health therefore is of high priority \u2014 perhaps the one at the top.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Court opined that the branch of health care of citizens involved an ever-changing challenge. The problem was a shifting one, and could not have a fixed process to deal with the situations that would arise from time to time. Therefore, the Court allowed the Central Government to adopt an approved national policy, and prescribed an adequate number of formulations which would, on the whole, meet the requirement of the people at large, on the basis of expert advice. However, the Court warned that it was necessary to keep abreast of changing situations and to make proper and timely amendments. The Court, while laying down the guidelines on this aspect, held that injurious drugs were to be totally eliminated from the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              For the Common Man<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The case highlights the importance of healthy living, and institutionalises the right to health within the constitutional precincts. Considering the gravity of the situation, the Court urged the Government to take timely action against drugs proved to be unfit for human consumption. However, the reluctance of the Court to give directions regarding the nationalisation of the industry shows the cautious approach of the Court in treading into the role of the executive \u2014 a laudable trend, for which the judiciary has been severely criticised of late.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n\n\n\n

                                                                              (50) Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Facts in Brief<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition was an incident of the alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village in Rajasthan. The petition was brought as a class action by certain social activists and NGOs, with the aim of focusing attention on this societal aberration, and assisting in finding suitable methods for the realisation of the true concept of “gender equality,”<\/strong> and to prevent sexual harassment of working women in all workplaces through the judicial process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Judgment<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Court, while admitting the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, held that such incidents resulted in the violation of the fundamental rights of “Gender Equality”<\/strong> and the “Right to Life and Liberty.”<\/strong> The Court declared them to be a clear violation of the rights under Articles 14 (Right to Equality), 15 (Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth) and 21 (Right to life and liberty) of the Constitution, and stated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n

                                                                              “One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) ‘to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business.'”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              It further observed that the fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depended on the availability of a “safe” working environment. Right to life means life with dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              Taking note of the various international conventions to this effect, the Court went on to lay down guidelines to be observed in both private and public employment, so as to ensure that incidents of sexual harassment at the workplace were not repeated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              The Court defined “sexual harassment” as including:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                              \n

                                                                              “Such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                \n
                                                                              • physical contact and advances;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                              • a demand or request for sexual favours;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                              • sexually coloured remarks;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                              • showing pornography;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                                                                              • any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.”<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                The Court held that where any of these acts were committed in circumstances whereunder the victim of such conduct had a reasonable apprehension that, in relation to the victim’s employment or work \u2014 whether she was drawing salary or honorarium, or working voluntarily, whether in Government, public or private enterprise \u2014 such conduct would be considered as humiliating and constituting health and safety problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                Such treatment was also discriminatory, as the woman had reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work, including recruitment or promotion, or when it created a hostile work environment, and adverse consequences might be visited on her if she did not give consent to the conduct in question, or raised any objection thereto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                The Court also gave other directions to ensure that no sexual harassment took place at the workplace, and the responsibility for ensuring the same was placed on the employer. It was further directed that the complaint of the sexually harassed worker was to be addressed at the workplace; therefore, Complaint Committees were to be formulated. The Court also ordered employers to create awareness about the right of being protected from sexual harassment, and for that, it ordered that these guidelines, and any law in this regard, be notified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                For the Common Man<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                This case lays down the framework and guidelines for the protection of working women from sexual harassment at the workplace. It thus fills the gap on the much-needed point of sexual harassment at the workplace. Another aspect to be noted here is that these guidelines are equally applicable to private employers as they are to Government employers, thereby ensuring that the protection extends everywhere, and the life, dignity and profession of a working woman are adequately protected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                                                                \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                                                                Explore detailed explanations of the 50 most pivotal Indian Supreme Court judgments that shaped the nation\u2019s legal landscape. From fundamental rights and environmental protection to gender equality and criminal justice reform, this comprehensive guide breaks down landmark cases, key legal arguments, court rulings, and their lasting impact on constitutional law and everyday life.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":14841,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14838","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-bachelor-laws"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14838","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14838"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14838\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14864,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14838\/revisions\/14864"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14841"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14838"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14838"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.infipark.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14838"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}