Facts in Brief

The Petitioner was elected as a member of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) as a candidate of the Indian National Congress. Thereafter, the notification for holding elections to the Lok Sabha was issued, and the Petitioner contested that election from another constituency as an independent candidate. One Salman Rageev, a member of the BLC, sent a petition to the Chairman of the Legislative Council stating that the Petitioner, who was a member of the Congress Party, had contested the parliamentary election as an independent candidate and had consequently, in view of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, become disqualified from being a member of the House. The Petitioner was thereupon asked to submit his explanation.

After considering the explanation tendered by him, the Chairman of the Legislative Council passed an order holding that, by contesting the election as an independent candidate while he was already a member from the Congress, the Petitioner had voluntarily given up his membership of the Congress Party. He was therefore disqualified from being a member of the House in view of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, read with Article 191(2) of the Constitution, and the seat held by him in the House had become vacant. This order was contested before the Supreme Court.

Arguments

The Petitioner argued that: (a) in the absence of compliance with Rules 6 and 7 of the Bihar Legislative Council Members (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1994, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Chairman in initiating the proceedings — under which the Petitioner was held to be disqualified from being a member of the House — was illegal; (b) there was a violation of the principles of natural justice, as the material relied upon by the Chairman was not disclosed to the Petitioner, nor was a proper opportunity of personal hearing afforded to him; and (c) it could not be assumed that the Petitioner had voluntarily given up membership of a political party by contesting the Lok Sabha election as an independent candidate, and therefore he had not incurred any disqualification within the meaning of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.

Judgment

The Apex Court held that the Chairman of the Legislative Council had found that the fact that the Petitioner had been elected to the Legislative Council on the ticket of the Indian National Congress, and had contested the parliamentary election as an independent candidate, was established and was in fact also accepted by the Petitioner. There could therefore be no escape from the conclusion that the Petitioner had incurred the disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Schedule, and the decision of the Chairman was accordingly correct.

For the Common Man

Giving full support towards reducing the menacing element of political clout in the Indian political arena, the Supreme Court declared in this case, in categorical terms, that prohibitive restrictions such as the anti-defection law shall be interpreted in the widest terms. The analogy accepted by the Court — of an implied change in party affiliation — shows the Court’s concern for curbing such unhealthy practices on the part of politicians.

(13) Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420

Facts in Brief

The issue for consideration before the Apex Court in this case was whether admissions to a medical college, or any other institution of higher learning situated in a State, could be confined to those who had their “domicile” within that State, or to those who had been resident within the State for a specified number of years; or whether any reservation in admissions could be made for them so as to give them precedence over those who did not possess a “domicile” or residential qualification within the State, irrespective of merit.

Arguments

The Petitioners challenged the said policy of admission on the ground of domicile, pressing the equality clause as provided under Articles 14, 15 and 19, and Article 301 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the residential requirement as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under the State was unconstitutional, having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word “State” in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India.

The Respondents defended the policy on the ground that Article 16(2) had no application so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college were concerned. It was argued that what Article 16(2) provided was the invalidation of discrimination on the ground of place of birth, and since the condition in the present case related to residence, it was not hit by the said Article.

Judgment

Dismissing the petition, the Apex Court held that each and every kind of discrimination was not a violation of the constitutional concept of equality, and did not necessarily undermine the unity of India. The validity of any discrimination was to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, wherein an appropriate classification may form the very core of equality and promote unity in the true sense amidst diversity. The Court thereby upheld reservation of seats on the ground of domicile.

For the Common Man

The message of the Court in this case is loud and clear. While an arbitrary and irrational discrimination between people shall not be tolerated at any cost, there can be reasonable classification in order to promote equality in the true sense of the term. Thus, reservation of seats on the ground of domicile — being meant to promote a particular class of backward or under-developed area — shall be allowed so as to promote and achieve equality in the true sense.