The 50 Most Important Indian Court Judgments Explained

#Case Name
1A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case)
2Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab
3Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra
4Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
5BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India
6Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
7Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar
8Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan
9D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
10Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
11Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai
12Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council
13Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India
14Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India
15Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India
16Gaurav Jain v. Union of India
17Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar
18I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab
19In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra
20In Re: Death of Sawinder Singh Grover
21Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India
22Indra Sawhney v. Union of India
23L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
24Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India
25M/s Modi Cements Limited v. Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi
26M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame
27Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D’costa
28Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
29Minerva Mills v. Union of India
30Mr. X v. Hospital Z
31Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani
32Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia
33Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
34Poonam Verma v. Dr. Ashwin Patel
35Parmanand Katara v. Union of India
36PUCL v. Union of India
37Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab
38Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
39S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India
40Sakshi v. Union of India
41Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
42Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty
43Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab
44Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
45Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement
46State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat
47State of Rajasthan v. Union of India
48Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration
49Vincent v. Union of India
50Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

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(22) Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477

Facts in Brief

Complying with the mandate under Article 340 of the Constitution, the Central Government appointed a Backward Class Commission on 29 January 1953 to determine the backward classes in the country. The Commission — popularly known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission — submitted its report, but the Government, being not satisfied with the approach adopted by the Commission in determining the criteria for identifying the backward classes under Article 15(4), did not accept its recommendations.

Thereupon, a second Backward Class Commission — popularly known as the Mandal Commission — was appointed to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India. The recommendations of this Commission were accepted and implemented by the Central Government. Several writ petitions were filed against this order of the Government implementing the recommendations.

As the matter of reservation had been settled by various earlier decisions of the Court, which were sought to be affected by this order, the present Bench of nine Judges was constituted to finally settle the legal position relating to reservations, and also to decide the issues relating to the interpretation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

Judgment

The Apex Court held as follows:

  • The words “provision for the reservation” in Article 16(4) refer to a provision to be made by the executive wing of the State, and not the legislature. The executive is therefore competent to provide for any determination of backwardness.
  • Executive orders made by the Government in terms of Article 16(4) are enforceable forthwith, without there being any need for a law by Parliament on the subject.
  • Article 16(4) is not an exception to, but an explanation and facet of, Article 16(1).
  • Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the concept of reservation for the backward classes, but is not exhaustive of the concept of reservation itself under the constitutional precincts.
  • The interpretation that Article 16(1) does not permit reservation is erroneous.
  • Neither the Constitution prescribes, nor is it possible for the Court to lay down, any procedure for the determination of “backward class.” It is better left to the authority appointed to identify them, which could adopt such method or procedure as it thought convenient; so long as it covered the entire populace, no objection could be taken to it.
  • The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were covered within the ambit of the term “backward classes,” while other socially and economically backward classes were also covered.
  • Economic criterion could not be the only criterion for the determination of “backward class.”
  • There could not be any further categorisation within the backward class so identified.
  • The reservation provided under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50% of the total posts.
  • The carry-forward rule (for unfilled vacancies) was not subject to the 50% limit.
  • Article 16(4) does not permit a rule of reservation even in promotion.

For the Common Man

This judgment has the following facets:

  • The Court did not give a definite interpretation to the term “backward class,” and directed the Government to come out with a definition in this regard. Thus, the main issue still remains undecided as to for whom the protection has been granted under Article 16(4), and who all can avail of the same.
  • This arduous exercise by the Court to give a definite standpoint to the interpretation of Article 16 went in vain, as it did not seek to resolve the conflict over reservation, and also because a majority of the propositions settled in the decision have been either overruled in later judgments or set aside by legislative amendments.

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