Facts in Brief

This case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC). The provision stated that in certain States where there were Deputy Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners, the State Government could invest the District Magistrate, or any Magistrate of the first class, with the power to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death. Under Section 34, such a Magistrate could try a case and sentence the convict, except to a sentence of death, transportation for a term exceeding seven years, or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.

In the appellant’s case, a criminal case was referred to the Deputy Commissioner by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Commissioner, in turn, transferred the file to a Magistrate with powers under Section 30 of the CrPC, and a sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment was imposed on the appellant under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged the said section, but the High Court upheld it. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court for final determination, where the issue was whether Section 30 of the CrPC was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all.

Arguments

It was argued before the Court that: (a) a Magistrate under Section 30 is enjoined to try the case before him as a Magistrate and must accordingly follow the warrant procedure, which differs from the procedure followed by a Court of Session. In a Court of Session, the accused was entitled to the benefit of commitment proceedings before a Magistrate and then a trial before the Sessions Judge with the aid of a jury or assessors. This was denied under Section 30, and the provision was therefore violative of Article 14, as there was an infraction of the fundamental right of equality in such cases. (b) The provision was liable to be abused, as it discriminated between persons accused of offences of the same kind, since the police had the discretion of sending a person accused of an offence under a particular Section to a Section 30 Magistrate, or of sending another person accused of the same offence under the same Section to a Magistrate who could commit the accused to the Court of Session.

Judgment

The Apex Court held that Section 30 of the CrPC did not violate the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, for the following reasons:

• Article 14 does not prohibit a reasonable classification. The only requirement is that the differentia on the basis of which the classification is made must be intelligible, and must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. The Court also held that a classification could be based on geographical or territorial considerations.
• The risk of being tried by a Section 30 Magistrate fell alike upon all persons committing such an offence. There was therefore no discrimination in the Section itself.
• The discretion to try the offence under Section 30 or otherwise rested with the Magistrate, and not with the police, since it was upon the Magistrate to commit the accused to the Court of Session instead of disposing of the case himself, if he thought that the ends of justice would be met.
• In case of any intentional or purposeful discrimination against the appellants by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the District Magistrate, or the Section 30 Magistrate, the law provided for revision by superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate Courts.

For the Common Man

The importance of this judgment lies in the fact that it establishes that even the judiciary comes within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, for the purposes of enforcing Fundamental Rights; and in case of any infringement of them by the judiciary, the superior courts are entitled to scrutinise such actions.