Facts in Brief

The Appellant, Gian Kaur, and her husband were convicted by the Trial Court for abetment of the suicide of one Kulwant Kaur. The Appellant challenged the conviction, contending that Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was unconstitutional. The said challenge was based upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 394, wherein Section 309 of the IPC had been declared unconstitutional as being violative of Article 21. The matter was raised before a Division Bench of the Court, which — considering the importance of the issue — referred it to a Constitution Bench of five Judges.

Arguments

The following arguments were raised before the Supreme Court:

1. The Appellants contended that the “right to die” had become a fundamental right under Article 21 after the decision in P. Rathinam, and therefore Section 306 of the IPC, which did not allow another to assist in the enforcement of this fundamental right to die, was unconstitutional.
2. They also submitted that since it was settled that Article 21 had a wide meaning, wherein the term “life” does not mean “mere animal existence” but “right to live with human dignity,” embracing the quality of life, it must logically follow that the right to live would include the right not to live — that is, the right to die, or to terminate one’s life.
3. As an amicus curiae, Fali J. Nariman submitted that Article 21 could not be construed to include within it the so-called “right to die,” since Article 21 guaranteed the protection of life and liberty, and not its extinction.
4. Another amicus curiae, Soli J. Sorabjee, submitted that Section 306 could survive independently of Section 309 of the IPC, as it did not violate either Article 14 or Article 21, as was the case with Section 309.

Judgment

The Supreme Court negated the contention that the right to life included the right to terminate one’s life. It observed that “the right to die,” if any, is inherently inconsistent with the “right to life,” as inconsistent as is “death with life.” Thus, it overruled the decision in P. Rathinam, and Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code were declared to be constitutional. The Court specifically rejected the argument of mercy killing or euthanasia as not permissible in India, owing to the protection given under Article 21.

For the Common Man

The judgment is consequential on account of the following:

1. The Court observed that the protection under Article 21 was of a protective nature, and thus could not be read so as to make the right to live with dignity be interpreted as the right to end one’s life if one was not capable of dignified existence.
2. Article 21 was characterised as having a positive content only, as contrary to other fundamental rights which could be interpreted both positively as well as negatively — such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of business, etc., wherein the right to do included the right not to do.
3. The “right to commit suicide” (or “to die”) was held to be not available in India, on account of the specific restriction under Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. This case is an illustrious example of the doctrine of eclipse. The unconstitutionality imposed on Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code in P. Rathinam was reversed in this case, and thus a law which was void and inapplicable was rendered valid and applicable again. The Section remained a dead law during the interval, but it did not cease to exist.

Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have reaffirmed the view that the life of an individual is not his own, but belongs to society. Thus, it being in the interests of society, he shall not be allowed to end it prematurely, prior to a natural end.