Facts in Brief

The precise issue which arose for consideration in the present case was: Whether prisoners, who were required to do labour as part of their punishment, should necessarily be paid wages for such work at the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages law?

The appeals were made by various State Governments against the decisions of their High Courts, wherein it had been held that prisoners should be paid wages, and that the then-prevailing rates of wages paid to them were too meagre and were therefore liable to be enhanced.

Arguments

It was argued that: (a) when hard labour was made a part of punishment as lawfully imposed, it could be equated with the normal employer-employee phenomenon, so as to entitle the prisoner to the social and legislative benefits which a free employee gets outside the walls of the prison; (b) Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution clearly declared the “Right against Exploitation,” wherein there was an absolute prohibition against “forced labour” — an expression which seemed to be collocated with the word “begar”; and (c) under Article 21, like any other workman, a prisoner was also entitled to wages, and therefore the only question that remained to be considered was at what rate prisoners should be paid for their work.

Judgment

The Court specifically declared that:

(a) It was lawful to employ prisoners sentenced to rigorous imprisonment to do hard labour, whether they consented to do it or not.

(b) It was open to the jail officials to permit other prisoners also to do any work which they chose to do, provided such prisoners made a request for that purpose.

(c) It was imperative that prisoners should be paid equitable wages for the work done by them.

(d) In order to determine the quantum of equitable wages payable to prisoners, the State concerned should constitute a wage fixation body for making recommendations.

The Court therefore directed the State Governments to fix the wage rate; and until the State Government had taken any decision on such recommendations, every prisoner was to be paid wages for the work done by him at such rates or revised rates as the Government concerned fixed, in the light of the observations made above.

The Court also recommended that the States concerned make a law for setting apart a portion of the wages earned by prisoners, to be paid as compensation to deserving victims of the offence the commission of which entailed the sentence of imprisonment to the prisoner — either directly, or through a common fund to be created for this purpose, or in any other feasible mode.

Another aspect of the judgment is the victimological approach it adopts. It observed:

“Rehabilitation of the prisoner need not be by closing the eyes towards the suffering victims of the offence. A glimpse at the field of Victimology reveals two types of victims: (a) direct victims, i.e., those who are alive and suffering on account of the harm inflicted by the prisoner while committing the crime; (b) indirect victims, i.e., those who are dependants of the direct victims of crimes, who undergo sufferings due to deprivation of their breadwinner. Restorative and reparative theories have developed from the aforesaid thinking. These are not theories of punishment. Rather, their argument is that sentences should move away from punishment of the offender towards restitution and reparation, aimed at restoring the harm done and calculated accordingly. Restorative theories are therefore victim-centred, although in some versions they encompass the notion of reparation to the community for the effects of crime. They envisage less resort to custody, with onerous community-based sanctions requiring offenders to work in order to compensate victims, and also contemplating support and counselling for offenders to reintegrate them into the community. Such theories therefore tend to act on a behavioural premise similar to rehabilitation, but their political premise is that compensation for victims should be recognised as more important than notions of just punishment on behalf of the State. Legal systems based on a restorative rationale are rare, but the increasing tendency to insert victim-orientated measures such as compensation orders into sentencing systems structured to impose punishment provides a fine example of Garland’s observation that ‘institutions are the scenes of particular conflicts as well as being means to a variety of ends, so it is no surprise to find that each particular institution combines a number of often incompatible objectives, and organises the relations of often antagonistic interest groups.'”

For the Common Man

The importance of the case lies in the thrust it gives to victimological jurisprudence in our country. It set a trend in sentencing policy towards listening to the wailings of the victims. Further, the judgment is also hailed for acknowledging the existence of the human rights of prisoners, and their entitlement to remuneration for the work they did.